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 
ABSTRACT 
Banks and credit unions sometimes complain that the examination 
process regulators use to police banking practices is oppressive. These 
financial institutions complain that regulators reach unduly negative 
examination conclusions known as “material supervisory 
determinations.” Institutions are wary because negative determinations 
can subject an institution to further regulatory scrutiny or enforcement 
actions. 
To guard against erroneous determinations, Congress, in 1994, 
enacted a statute requiring federal financial institution regulators to 
provide an appeals process. Each of the four regulators (the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration) 
adopted a unique material supervisory determination appeals process. 
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Using data (some collected through Freedom of Information Act 
requests) about material supervisory decision appeals since 1994 and 
interviews with top regulators, this Article provides the first in-depth 
analysis of the appeals processes. It shows that the appeals processes are 
sometimes dysfunctional and seldom used. 
To improve the appeals processes, the Article recommends three 
changes. First, once a regulator issues a material supervisory 
determination, financial institutions should have direct access to a 
dedicated appellate authority outside of the examination function. Second, 
the appellate authority should engage in a robust review; it should 
consider a broad scope of appealable matters and employ a clear and 
rigorous standard of review. Third, regulators should release detailed 
information about each decision reached by the appellate authority. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Financial institutions
1
 are among the most heavily regulated businesses 
in the United States. To ensure that institutions comply with the complex 
web of laws, regulators conduct regular examinations. During an on-site 
examination, regulators comb the institution’s books, records, policies, 
and practices, looking for evidence of legal infractions and financial stress. 
Examiners then make a number of “material supervisory determinations” 
(“MSDs”) about the institution’s financial health and compliance with the 
law.
2
 The examiners prepare an examination report detailing these 
findings. In between on-site examinations, regulators collect and review 
institutions’ financial information, looking for potential issues. This 
review can also lead to MSDs. 
MSDs become the building blocks of regulatory enforcement. In cases 
where MSDs suggest a financial institution needs to improve, regulators 
employ formal or informal enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the 
institution corrects any problems. For example, a regulator might issue a 
cease-and-desist order instructing the institution to stop certain lending 
activities.
3
 In more extreme cases, regulators might close the institution.
4
 
 
 
 1. As used in this Article, the terms “financial institution” and “institution” refer to banks, credit 
unions, bank holding companies, and financial holding companies. In some circumstances, I 
distinguish between “banks” (which are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the Federal Reserve, and/or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) and “credit unions” (which are 
regulated by the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund).  
 2. MSDs include “determinations relating to . . . (i) examination ratings; (ii) the adequacy of 
loan loss reserve provisions; and (iii) loan classifications on loans that are significant to an institution.” 
12 U.S.C. § 4806(f)(1)(A) (2012). 
 3. Id. §§ 1818(b), 1786(b). 
 4. Id. §§ 191, 1464(d), 1787(a), 1818(a)(2) (allowing for the government closure of financial 
institutions). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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MSDs are often the initial findings that set the regulatory enforcement 
mechanism in motion. 
In the aftermath of the September 2008 financial market meltdown, 
some financial institutions complain that regulators are trending toward 
overly aggressive examination practices.
5
 At its root, dissatisfaction with 
the examination process often indicates that institutions disagree with 
examiners about MSDs. Some institutions believe that regulators do not 
consistently apply existing law, claiming that “examiners tended to focus 
too much on their own view of best practices rather than on legal and 
regulatory requirements.”6 Institutions also complain that regulators 
change examination standards without warning. They claim that “[w]hat 
was once A-OK is no longer A-OK, but no one knows that until after the 
examination.”7 Some reports even claim that examiners act with bias or 
malice.
8
 
To guard against erroneous MSDs, financial institution regulators are 
statutorily required to provide an “independent intra-agency appellate 
process . . . to review material supervisory determinations made at insured 
depository institutions.”9 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(“Federal Reserve”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), 
and the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) have each 
implemented a different procedure for handling these appeals.
10
 
 
 
 5. See, e.g., The Financial Institutions Examination Fairness and Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 
3461 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servcs., 112th 
Cong. 164 (2012) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3461] (written statement of Noah Wilcox, President & 
CEO, Grand Rapids State Bank) (“There is an unmistakable trend toward arbitrary, micromanaged, 
and unreasonably harsh examinations.”). 
 6. Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 150 (statement of Ken Watts, President & CEO, West 
Virginia Credit Union League).  
 7. Bryan McKenzie, Small Banks Struggle with New Regulations, DAILY PROGRESS 
(Charlottesville, VA), Sept. 5, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 17668535 (quoting Patricia G. 
Satterfield, President & CEO, Virginia Association of Community Banks). See also Steve Cocheo, 
Tough Times on the Exam Front, ABA BANKING J., Nov. 2009, at 6 (“Management that was brilliant 
two years ago running a CAMELS 1-rated bank now appears to be a bunch of idiots running a 4- or 5-
rated bank.”) (quoting banking attorney Jeffrey Gerrish). 
 8. See Heather Anderson, OIG Dismisses Ohio Exam Claims, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Oct. 17, 
2012, at 1, 20 (reporting on a credit union complaint that an examiner had introduced himself as “The 
Liquidator,” harassed credit union staff, and retaliated when the credit union appealed the exam 
rating); George Waldon, Bank’s Tiff with the OCC Takes a Twist, ARK. BUS., Oct. 8, 2012, at 24 
(reporting on an Arkansas bank’s claim that it received a cease-and-desist order due to a “prejudicial 
bias [that] flowed from something akin to personal animosity”). 
 9. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(a) (2012). 
 10. See BANK APPEALS PROCESS, OCC BULLETIN 2013-15 (June 7, 2013) available at 
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-2013-15.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
BS84-4CLH [hereinafter OCC BULLETIN 2013-15]; Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/5
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Since regulators implemented the MSD appeals processes in 1995, 
little has been done to analyze their effectiveness. Part of the reason for the 
lack of scrutiny is that regulators keep much of the information about 
appeals, including some decisions, secret.
11
 In addition, regulators 
themselves have failed to conduct any serious study of the appeals 
processes.
12
 Using data from MSD appeals (some of which I collected 
through Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests) and my 
interviews with top-level regulators,
13
 this Article provides the previously 
untold story of these appeals. 
The story is that of a dysfunctional and seldom-used system. 
Regulators vary significantly in the reviews they provide through the MSD 
appeals processes. They do not agree on which examiner determinations 
are appealable or on the applicable standard of review.
14
 Even considering 
the state of the regulators’ appeals policies, the rate of appeals is 
astonishingly low. Thousands of financial institutions have been examined 
 
 
Fed. Reg. 16,470 (Mar. 30, 1995); FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055 (Mar. 23, 
2012); NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,871 (Apr. 29, 
2011); NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 77 Fed. Reg. 322,004 (May 31, 
2012).  
 11. See infra notes 130, 211, 262, 336–37 and accompanying text.  
 12. In 2012, the Inspector General of each federal financial institution regulator reviewed its 
agency’s MSD appeals process. The reports generated from these reviews were far from scrutinizing. 
After recounting the appeals process, the reports all noted that few institutions chose to appeal. None 
of the reports offered extensive suggestions for improvement or compared the effectiveness of the 
appeals processes across regulators. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS: REVIEW OF OCC COMMUNITY BANK EXAMINATION AND 
APPEALS PROCESSES (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/ 
Audit%20Reports%20and%20Testimonies/OIG12070.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KP3A-XHYP 
[hereinafter OCC OIG REPORT]; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., AUDIT OF THE SMALL COMMUNITY BANK EXAMINATION PROCESS (2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/Audit_SCB_Exam_Process_August2012.pdf [hereinafter 
FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT]; FDIC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE FDIC’S EXAMINATION 
PROCESS FOR SMALL COMMUNITY BANKS (2012), available at http://www.fdicoig.gov/reports12/12-
011AUD.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DQD6-R4Q9 [hereinafter FDIC OIG REPORT]; NCUA 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF NCUA’S EXAMINATION AND COMPLAINT PROCESSES FOR 
SMALL CREDIT UNIONS (2012), available at http://www.ncua.gov/about/Leadership/CO/ 
OIG/Documents/OIG-12-10ReviewExamProcess.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KPG4-M4ND 
[hereinafter NCUA OIG REPORT]. 
 13. Interview with Samuel P. Golden, Managing Dir., Alvarez & Marsal, former Ombudsman, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, in Houston, Tex. (Nov. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Golden 
Interview]; Telephone Interview with Larry L. Hattix, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Enterprise 
Governance & Ombudsman, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 14. 2013) [hereinafter 
Hattix Interview]; Telephone Interview with Joy K. Lee, Supervisory Review Comm. Chair & 
Ombudsman, Nat’l Credit Union Admin. (Apr. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Lee Interview]; Telephone 
Interview with Hattie M. Ulan, Senior Ethics Counsel, former member Supervisory Review Comm., 
Nat’l Credit Union Admin. (June 18, 2013) [hereinafter Ulan Interview].  
 14. See generally infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1, II.C.1, II.D.1 (discussing the appealable 
determinations and standard of review used by each federal financial institution regulator).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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every year since regulators adopted their appeals processes in 1995. Yet 
the OCC Ombudsman has issued only 157 decisions, the Federal Reserve 
has decided just 25 appeals (although data from 1995–2000 are 
unavailable for the Federal Reserve), the FDIC’s Supervision Appeals 
Review Committee has issued only 63 decisions, and the NCUA’s 
Supervisory Review Committee has issued 6 decisions.
15
 When 
institutions do appeal, they seldom win. Most shockingly, the NCUA’s 
Supervisory Review Committee has overturned only one MSD—the 
denial of a $5,000 grant reimbursement from the Office of Small Credit 
Union Initiatives.
16
 
In light of the limited usefulness of the current MSD appeals processes, 
I recommend three changes. First, all financial institution regulators 
should adopt a consistent and broad scope of appealable matters. All 
examination ratings should be appealable. Moreover, institutions should 
be able to appeal MSDs that underlie enforcement actions if the financial 
institution consented to the enforcement action. Second, all financial 
institution regulators should adopt a consistent and robust standard of 
review for evaluating appeals of MSDs. I favor a de novo standard of 
review. Third, all financial institution regulators should release decisions 
from appeals of MSDs. Although the decisions should be redacted 
sufficiently to protect the anonymity of the appealing financial institution 
and its customers, the released information should be complete enough to 
allow institutions, regulators, and the public to learn how the agency reads 
and applies relevant statutes and regulations. Although the reforms I 
propose do not go as far as proposals that would create a single super-
Ombudsman to hear appeals from all financial institutions,
17
 my reforms 
target observable weaknesses in the current processes. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief overview of 
financial institution examinations. It then describes the creation of the 
MSD appeals processes. Part II provides a description of the MSD appeals 
processes as implemented by each federal regulator. It details not only the 
rules governing the appeals processes, but also institutions’ usage of the 
processes. Part III discusses shortcomings of the current appeals processes, 
and Part IV discusses recommendations for improvement.  
 
 
 15. The MSD appeals data in this article end in 2012. 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 357–58. 
 17. See infra Part IV.D. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/5
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I. REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
Financial institutions are subject to a detailed and complex regulatory 
structure. Reams of safety and soundness laws aim to keep institutions 
solvent while additional regulations seek to ensure that institutions deal 
fairly with consumers. Regulators ensure that institutions comply with 
laws by employing examination and enforcement powers. 
This part describes the financial institution examination and 
enforcement system, paying particular attention to the role of MSDs in the 
system. This part then describes the Congressional mandate that financial 
institution regulators provide an “independent intra-agency appellate 
process”18 to review MSDs. 
A. Examination and Enforcement 
Examinations are the cornerstone of a regulatory system designed to 
keep financial institutions safe and sound. Regulators typically conduct a 
yearly “full-scope, on-site examination” at each financial institution.19 
During an examination, regulators visit a financial institution to review the 
institution’s policies, procedures, and records. Examiners then rate the 
institution using the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System.
20
 
Under the System, regulators evaluate the safety and soundness of 
institutions using the “CAMEL” or “CAMELS” factors: capital, assets, 
management, earnings, liquidity, and susceptibility to market risk.
21
 
 
 
 18. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(a) (2012). 
 19. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(1) (2012). There are a few exceptions to this general rule. State-
chartered banks may be examined by their federal regulator every other year if the state regulator 
conducts an adequate examination during the year that the federal regulator does not. Id. § 1820(d)(3). 
In addition, regulators may examine certain small, healthy, and well-managed banks on an eighteen-
month cycle. Id. § 1820(d)(4). Federal regulators examine federally chartered credit unions on a 
twelve-month cycle. See Examining the Health of the Credit Union Industry as We Emerge from the 
Financial Crisis and Recover and Grow Our Economy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 6, 8, 25 (2010) (statement of Deborah Matz, Chairman, NCUA). 
However, for federally-insured state-chartered credit unions, the federal regulator, “[t]o the maximum 
extent feasible, . . . utilize[s] examinations conducted by state regulatory agencies.” 12 C.F.R. § 741.1 
(2014). The federal credit union regulator schedules examinations of state-chartered credit unions 
“based on risk factors of individual credit unions.” NCUA, EXAMINER’S GUIDE 26-4, available at 
http://www.ncua.gov/Legal/GuidesEtc/Pages/Examiners-Guide.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). State 
credit unions that are large, have received a previous poor examination rating, or pose other unique 
risks are more likely to receive a federal examination. Id. 
 20. Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 67,021 (Dec. 19, 1996). 
 21. Id. “Federally insured credit unions are evaluated using the ‘CAMEL’ rating system, which is 
substantially similar to the ‘CAMELS’ system without the ‘S’ component for rating Sensitivity to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Regulators rate each item on a 1 to 5 scale, with a 1 rating being the 
highest possible score.
22
 Examiners also award each institution a 
composite rating meant to assess the overall condition of the institution.
23
 
The composite score is not simply an average of the component ratings. 
Rather, in issuing a composite rating the regulator considers the 
components and “may incorporate any factor that bears significantly on 
the [institution’s] overall condition.”24 
To arrive at the component rating and overall ratings, examiners must 
make a number of additional conclusions about the institution. For 
example, examiners will review loan documentation to determine whether 
the institution has appropriately classified its risky loans and whether it 
has adequately reserved for those loans. If the examiners find a large 
amount of adversely classified loans when compared with the overall loan 
portfolio, the examiners may rate the institution’s assets as a 3, 4, or 5.25 
The examiners might also downgrade the institution’s management rating 
and composite rating based on the troubled loans.
26
 
Although regulators do not publicly release safety and soundness 
examination ratings,
27
 the ratings are serious business for financial 
institutions. Institutions that receive a 3, 4, or 5 rating have at least “some 
degree of supervisory concern.”28 Regulators commonly pursue formal 
enforcement actions, such as written agreements, consent orders, cease-
and-desist orders, capital directives, and prompt corrective action 
directives against institutions with these less-than-satisfactory ratings.
29
 
Formal enforcement actions can require an institution to undertake costly 
 
 
market risk.” OCC, FRB, FDIC, OTS, NCUA, Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and Liquidity 
Risk Management, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,656, 13,665 n.19 (Mar. 22, 2010). 
 22. Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 67,021, 67,022.  
 23. Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 67,021, 67,025.  
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. at 67,027 (explaining that the asset quality rating depends on the level and severity of 
classified assets).  
 26. See id. at 67,027–28 (explaining that both the management rating and the composite rating 
depend on the institution’s ability to effectively manage risk).  
 27. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 442 (5th ed. 2013). 
 28. Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 67,021, 67,026. 
 29. See Jim Rives, A Perspective on Regulatory Risk: Enforcement Actions and CAMELS, RMA 
J., Mar. 2011, at 20. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(8) (2012) (authorizing formal enforcement actions); 
Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 
658–62 (2012) (providing a more fulsome description of enforcement actions).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/5
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remedial measures.
30
 The CAMELS ratings are also used to determine the 
price banks pay for deposit insurance.
31
 As a result of a poor composite 
examination rating, regulators may choose to downgrade an institution’s 
capital classification.
32
 This can, among other things, prevent a bank from 
accepting brokered deposits
33
 and restrict an institution’s ability to grow.34 
Finally, institutions that receive poor examination ratings may face 
restrictions on the appointment of senior executive officers and directors.
35
 
In addition to the basic safety and soundness examination, regulators 
conduct specialized examinations to assess trust department operations,
36
 
information technology controls,
37
 compliance with consumer protection 
 
 
 30. See What an Enforcement Order Will Cost Your Bank, BANK SAFETY & SOUNDNESS 
ADVISOR, Nov. 22, 2010, at 1. Such an action can cost a “$100 million community bank . . . between 
$750,000 and $1 million in additional expenses, including hiring outside consultants, regulatory 
counsel and increased FDIC insurance premiums.” Id. For larger institutions, enforcement actions are 
probably even more costly. Id. (noting that a $348.6 million community bank spent between $1 million 
and $2 million on a cease-and-desist order). 
 31. 12 C.F.R. § 327.4; id. pt. 327, subpt. A, app. A (2014). Credit unions, however, pay share 
insurance premiums that are based on the institution’s number of insured shares outstanding without 
regard to the CAMEL rating. 12 U.S.C. § 1781(c)(2) (2012). 
 32. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(g) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 325.103(d) (2014) (FDIC); id. § 208.43(c) 
(Federal Reserve); id. § 702.102(b) (NCUA); id. § 6.4(d) (OCC). 
 33. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(a) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 337.6(b)(3)(i) (2014). Credit unions tend to 
“rely less on brokered sources of funds than banks.” Letter from Dennis Dollar, Acting Chairman, 
NCUA to Federally Insured Credit Unions (July 2001), available at http://www.ncua.gov/ 
Resources/Documents/LCU2001-08.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4TGG-HKR8. Thus, credit union 
regulations do not contain similar restrictions on brokered share accounts. 
 34. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(3) –(4) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 702.202(a)(3)–(4) (2014) (explaining 
that an undercapitalized institution cannot increase its average total assets, acquire any company, 
establish new branches, or enter new lines of business without regulator approval). 
 35. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 5.51(d) (2014) (requiring that a bank that is not adequately capitalized 
provide 90 days notice to the OCC before making changes to the board of directors or senior 
management); id. § 701.14(c) (requiring that a federally-insured credit union that receives a 4 or 5 
composite rating provide 30 days notice before makings changes to the board of directors or senior 
management). Banks may also face restrictions on golden parachutes—payments made to employees 
as a condition of terminating their employment. See id. § 359.  
 36. See generally OCC, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 12, 72–89 
(2014); DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REGULATION, FED. RESERVE, COMMERCIAL BANK 
EXAMINATION MANUAL §§ 4200.1, 6010.1 (2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/supmanual/cbem/cbem.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE EXAM MANUAL]; FDIC, TRUST 
EXAMINATION MANUAL (2005), available at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/ 
trustmanual/. The NCUA does not use the Uniform Interagency Trust Rating System. See Fed. Fin. 
Insts. Examination Council, Uniform Interagency Trust Rating Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 54,704 (Oct. 13, 
1998). 
 37. See generally FFIEC, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK INFOBASE: IT BOOKLETS, available at 
http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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laws,
38
 performance under the Community Reinvestment Act,
39
 and 
compliance with Bank Secrecy Act and other anti-money laundering 
laws.
40
 Like the safety and soundness examination, the specialized 
examinations involve regulators making MSDs. Adverse findings can lead 
to enforcement actions or other negative consequences for the institution.
41
 
In the event that a regulator issues an erroneous MSD, it is important 
for the receiving institution to get that determination corrected quickly. As 
regulators ramp up their enforcement efforts to correct a perceived 
problem, an institution may have little opportunity for redress. Regulators 
can issue some enforcement actions, such as capital directives (actions that 
order an institution to improve its capital ratios), without providing the 
institution a pre-order hearing.
42
 Even in circumstances where the law 
allows for a pre-order hearing, institutions often forego the hearing, 
believing there is little chance for redress when regulators have such broad 
discretion.
43
 When institutions do go to the trouble of contesting an order 
at a hearing, appealing to an administrative law judge, and then appealing 
to a federal district court, courts’ limited power to review these cases 
ensures that regulators almost always win.
44
 The prospects are even 
 
 
 38. In a compliance examination, regulators visit the institution to assess conformity with fair 
lending laws, consumer disclosure laws, unfair or abusive practice laws, and privacy laws. See 
generally OCC, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 12, 90–93 (2014); DIV. 
OF CONSUMER & CMTY. AFFAIRS, FEDERAL RESERVE, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK (2014); 
FDIC, COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL (2014); NCUA, EXAMINER’S GUIDE ch. 19, available at 
http://www.ncua.gov/Legal/GuidesEtc/Pages/Examiners-Guide.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
 39. See generally OCC, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 12, 94–105 
(2014); DIV. OF CONSUMER & CMTY. AFFAIRS, FED. RESERVE, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 
ch. VI.99 (2014); FDIC, COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL ch. XI (2014). Credit unions are not 
included within the scope of the Community Reinvestment Act and are not subject to Community 
Reinvestment Act examinations. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(c)(2), 2902–03 (2012). 
 40. In a Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money laundering examination, regulators assess an institution’s 
compliance with laws designed to help law enforcement officials “identify the source, volume, and 
movement of currency and other monetary instruments.” FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, 
BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 7 (2010). 
 41. For example, although the Community Reinvestment Act does not generally allow regulators 
to bring enforcement actions against banks that do not adequately serve the credit needs of the 
community, the examiner’s report is publicly released. See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 
27, at 361. Thus, any adverse finding may damage the institution’s reputation. 
 42. See FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 43. See Joseph T. Lynyak III, Responding to Capital Directives and Related Enforcement 
Actions, 129 BANKING L.J. 387, 390 (2012) (“[B]ecause the Bank Regulators’ enforcement 
alternatives are so expansive[,] . . . banks do not elect to contest administratively the issuance of a 
package of capital-related orders.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Frontier State Bank v. FDIC, 702 F.3d 588, 597 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that a 
regulator’s decision to set an individual bank minimum capital requirement in a cease-and-desist order 
was not subject to judicial review because Congress granted complete discretion to bank regulators); 
Greene Cnty. Bank v. FDIC, 92 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a regulator’s conclusion 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/5
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grimmer for institutions that are closed by their regulators. If an institution 
waits until it is closed to raise regulatory concerns, it will likely be 
impossible to obtain adequate redress.
45
  
In some administrative settings, elected officials, the media, and the 
court of public opinion serve as additional safety valves for regulated 
entities that are unhappy with the administrative process. Financial 
institutions, however, are constrained in their ability to raise institution-
specific concerns with anyone other than their attorneys, accountants, and 
regulators. Examination reports remain the property of the regulator even 
after they have been issued to the bank.
46
 The institution cannot disclose 
nonpublic examination information without risking administrative and 
criminal sanctions.
47
 
For their part, regulators should also have an interest in correcting 
erroneous MSDs. Pursuing unnecessary enforcement actions diverts 
regulatory attention from pressing problems. If a financial institution 
expends significant time and effort addressing an erroneous determination, 
it may prevent the institution from addressing other important matters. 
Moreover, allowing erroneous MSDs to persist undermines the credibility 
of the supervisory process.  
 
 
that a bank had not complied with a memorandum of understanding was supported by substantial 
evidence). 
 45. Can You Sue to Reverse a Receivership, BANK SAFETY & SOUNDNESS ADVISOR, Apr. 4. 
2011, at 1 (explaining that regulators have broad power to close any financial institution with an 
“unsafe or unsound condition” and even if the regulator acts improperly the financial institution’s 
assets will likely have been sold to others before the legal challenge concludes). See also Lynyak, 
supra note 43, at 397 (“Although there are instances in which the closing of a bank may be viewed by 
stakeholders as unfair or perhaps illegal, there are no modern instances in which a bank closing has 
been reversed or enjoined.”). 
 46. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 4.32(b)(2), 4.36 (2014) (OCC); id. §§ 309.5(g)(8), 309.6(a), 350.9 (FDIC); 
id. §§ 261.2(c)(1), 261.20(g), 261.22(e) (Federal Reserve); id. § 792.30 (2014) (NCUA). 
 47. See Press Release, OCC, FDIC, Fed. Reserve & OTS, Interagency Advisory on the 
Confidentiality of the Supervisory Rating and Other Nonpublic Supervisory Information (Feb. 28, 
2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2005/pr1805a.html, archived at http://perma. 
cc/YZ4Q-EEMC (citing the criminal penalties associated with 18 U.S.C. § 641); Material Supervisory 
Determination Decision of Dec. 10, 1999, SARC-99-07 (FDIC Dec. 10, 1999), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/sarc/sarcappeals/sarc9907.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
5MK8-ZXTR (upholding an examiner determination that a bank had violated “Section 309.6 of FDIC 
Rules and Regulations, which prohibits disclosure of confidential supervisory information, without the 
prior approval of the FDIC” when the bank “copied individual members of Congress and the General 
Accounting Office . . . on its appeal of” an examination rating); Director Banned for Disclosing 
CAMEL Rating, CREDIT UNION J., Apr. 2, 2012, at 1 (reporting that the NCUA had banned a credit 
union director from associating with any credit union because he publicly disclosed a credit union 
CAMEL rating). 
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B. Appealing Material Supervisory Determinations  
Although both regulators and financial institutions have an interest in 
correcting erroneous MSDs, regulators were slow to allow appeals. The 
OCC was the first. In 1993, Comptroller Eugene A. Ludwig created the 
Office of the Ombudsman to handle MSD appeals.
48
 He appointed Samuel 
P. Golden, an OCC examiner, as the first Ombudsman.
49
 At the time, 
financial institutions and their regulators were still trying to recover from 
the banking crises of the 1980s.
50
 Some banks that had weathered the 
crises began to complain about the fairness of the bank examination 
process. They asked newly elected President Bill Clinton and Comptroller 
Ludwig for an independent avenue for appealing MSDs.
51
 Comptroller 
Ludwig obliged.
52
 
The OCC’s new Ombudsman operated outside of the OCC’s 
supervisory function, instead reporting directly to the Comptroller.
53
 The 
appeals process itself looked like binding arbitration.
54
 A bank would 
submit a written appeal describing what it believed was an erroneous 
determination. The Ombudsman would then contact the OCC examination 
 
 
 48. Eugene A. Ludwig, Column: After Dodd-Frank, More Ombudsmen, AM. BANKER, Sept. 16, 
2010, at 9. Technically, the FDIC announced an informal policy for reviewing supervisory decisions in 
early 1992, but the policy was short on details and only provided that the Division of Supervision 
Director would “make a good faith effort to evaluate and resolve” written complaints from banks. 
FDIC, Fin. Inst. Letter 11-92, Procedures for Requesting Review of Supervisory Decisions (Feb. 7, 
1992), available at 1992 WL 714970. 
 49. Stephen Goldstein, Metropolitan Money Movers & Shakers, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at 
B5. 
 50. See generally AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S, 
in 1 DIV. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
(1997), available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/ (explaining that a collapse of energy 
prices, real estate downturns, and an agricultural recession all combined to stress the banking 
industry). 
 51. Golden Interview, supra note 13 (“On [President Clinton’s] transition team . . . there were 
several key bankers from some of the largest banks in the country who said, ‘You need something to 
provide an avenue that when we disagree with the bank examiners that you don’t go to the fox in the 
henhouse . . . .’”). 
 52. OCC Banking Circular No. 272 (June 11, 1993).  
 53. Appeals Process, 13 OCC Q.J., no. 1, 1993–1994, at 61; Steve Cocheo, OCC’s First 
Ombudsman Hangs Out His Shingle, ABA BANKING J., Oct. 1993, at 6. The office was initially 
located in Houston, Texas in part to create an appearance of objectivity. Barbara A. Rehm, Former 
Examiner Ready for Job as OCC’s Complaint Department, AM. BANKER, Sept. 9, 1993, at 18.  
 54. Golden Interview, supra note 13 (“[T]he [appeals] process is binding arbitration because you 
listen to both sides, you go through, and you make a de novo separate decision on what is the right 
outcome.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2015] WHEN BANK EXAMINERS GET IT WRONG 1113 
 
 
 
 
staff for its written response and the relevant OCC documents.
55
 In most 
cases, Ombudsman Golden or his staff
56
 would visit the appealing bank to 
make an independent assessment.
57
 The Ombudsman would then issue a 
new and binding decision—a decision that could be more severe or more 
lenient than the decision reached by the examination staff.
58
  
According to Ombudsman Golden, his office was initially “inundated” 
with appeals.
59
 Banks were complimentary of the new appeals process and 
sometimes even more complimentary of Ombudsman Golden. After a 
northern California bank successfully appealed a “needs to improve” 
rating under the Community Reinvestment Act, the bank’s chief executive 
officer effused: “(Mr. Golden) is probably the best thing to happen to the 
OCC in a long time . . . . He’s bringing a discipline to the agency that is 
long overdue.”60  
Banks not regulated by the OCC took note and wanted other regulators 
to adopt a similar process.
61
 Based in part on the initial success of the 
OCC appeals process,
62
 Congress mandated that each banking regulator 
provide an “independent intra-agency appellate process . . . to review 
material supervisory determinations made at insured depository 
institutions.”63 Congress expected that the MSD appeals processes would 
 
 
 55. OCC Banking Circular No. 272 (June 11, 1993). Ombudsman Golden explained: “There 
were no forms that [were] required; there was no infrastructure that’s required. You simply frame[d] 
the issue that you [had].” Golden Interview, supra note 13. 
 56. The OCC Ombudsman’s Office initially consisted of Ombudsman Golden and a single 
administrative assistant, but it hired three additional staff members in the first year. Rehm, supra note 
53, at 18; Golden Interview, supra note 13. 
 57. OCC policy allowed both examination staff and bank management the opportunity to request 
a telephone or in-person meeting. See OCC Banking Circular No. 272 (June 11, 1993). Under the 
direction of Ombudsman Golden, staff from the Ombudsman’s Office would almost always visit the 
bank. Golden Interview, supra note 13. 
 58. Appeals Process, supra note 53, at 61. 
 59. Golden Interview, supra note 13. See also Bill Atkinson, Bankers Not Shy About Appealing 
OCC Decisions, AM. BANKER, Jan. 31, 1994, at 6. 
 60. Terrence O’Hara, To Feisty CEO, ‘Needs to Improve’ Meant War, AM. BANKER, May 17, 
1994, at 8 (quoting Carl J. Schmitt, Chairman & CEO, Univ. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.). 
 61. Golden Interview, supra note 13 (“[The FDIC and Federal Reserve] would not have 
independently [created an independent MSD appeals process] had it not been for state banks who said, 
‘Why do national banks have that and we don’t?’ So that’s when Congress essentially mandated that 
they would do it.’”). It is not clear whether credit unions were equally interested in an appeals process. 
See Ulan Interview, supra note 13 (stating that she did not recall credit unions “clamoring for [an 
appeals] process”). 
 62. OCC REPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN 1995–1996, at 3 (1997). 
 63. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-325, § 309(a), 108 Stat. 2160, 2218 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4806(a) (2012)). The statute applies 
to “each appropriate Federal banking agency and the National Credit Union Administration Board.” Id. 
“Federal banking agency” is currently defined to include only the OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC. 
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(q), 4801(1) (2012). The newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
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“provide an avenue of redress for insured depository institutions . . . from 
uneven treatment by examiners.”64  
The appeals process must provide “a review by an agency official who 
does not directly or indirectly report to the agency official who made the 
material supervisory determination under review.”65 Regulators must also 
provide appropriate safeguards to protect financial institutions that appeal 
from retaliation by the regulator.
66
 
Appealable MSDs are defined to include “examination ratings,” “the 
adequacy of loan loss reserve provisions,” and “loan classifications on 
loans that are significant to an institution.”67 However, MSDs do not 
include regulators’ decisions to close financial institutions or take prompt 
corrective action, including the removal of officers and directors from 
undercapitalized institutions.
68
 Furthermore, the MSD appeals process 
does not “affect the authority of an appropriate Federal banking agency or 
the National Credit Union Administration Board to take enforcement or 
supervisory action.”69  
 
 
(“CFPB”), although generally thought of as an additional bank regulator, does not fall within the ambit 
of the statute. The CFPB has voluntarily established a supervisory appeals process, but notes that it “is 
not intended to nor should it be construed to . . . create or confer upon any person, including one who 
is the subject of CFPB supervisory, investigation or enforcement activity, any substantive or 
procedural rights or defenses that are enforceable in any manner.” CFPB Bulletin 2012-07, Appeals of 
Supervisory Matters 2 n.1 (Oct. 31, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_ 
cfpb_bulletin_supervisory-appeals-process.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/24H6-WE6P. There is no 
substantive reason that the CFPB should not be required by statute to provide an appeals process on 
par with other financial institution regulators. 
 64. S. REP. NO. 103-169, at 51 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1935 (explaining 
that “[e]venhandedness is important to maintain confidence in our regulatory system”). 
 65. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(f)(2) (2012). The statute provides only for “intra-agency” agency appeals 
processes. Id. § 4806(a). It does not address whether an MSD may be further appealed in federal court. 
See Donald R. Cassling, Banks Must Pursue All Agency Appeal Procedures Prior to Filing Suit 
Against the OCC, 121 BANKING L.J. 760, 762 (2004) (“As Section 4806 does not directly authorize 
judicial review of OCC deicisons, [financial institutions] must provide that a final agency action 
occurred.”). In Peoples Nat’l Bank v. OCC, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
explained in dicta that a bank may bring a claim in federal court under the Administrative Procedure 
Act after exhausting the MSD intra-agency process. 362 F.d 333, 336–37 (2004) (dismissing an appeal 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the bank had not filed an intra-agency appeal). However, I 
was unable to locate any judicial appeal of a decision made through any of the regulators’ MSD 
appeals processes. Because this article focuses on the intra-agency appeals processes, I do not further 
address the potential availability of judicial review.  
 66. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(b)(2) (2012). 
 67. Id. § 4806(f)(1)(A). 
 68. Id. § 4806(f)(1)(B). 
 69. Id. § 4806(g). 
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II. APPEALS PROCESSES BY REGULATOR 
Each federal financial institution regulator has taken a different path for 
providing the intra-agency review process required by statute. This Part 
first provides a description of each regulator’s MSD appeals process. It 
then describes how institutions have used the appeals processes. This Part 
draws on information from my interviews of past and current regulators 
who handle (or handled) MSD appeals.
70
 It also reports appeals data I 
gathered from public sources and through FOIA requests. While some 
information about MSD appeals is still not available, this Part provides the 
most comprehensive look at the MSD appeals processes to date. 
A. OCC 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency supervises banks and 
thrifts with national charters.
71
 In 2012, OCC oversaw 1783 banks,
72
 
including all of the largest U.S. banks—Bank of America, Wells Fargo 
Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, U.S. Bank, and PNC Bank.
73
 Although 
the OCC is often thought of as the large bank regulator, it also supervises 
about 1500 banks with less than $1 billion in assets.
74
 The OCC has 3823 
full-time equivalent employees.
75
  
 
 
 70. I sought interviews with many past and current agency officials. The Federal Reserve has 
adopted a process that essentially creates an ad hoc review committee for each appeal. See infra notes 
169–70 and accompanying text. Thus, it was impossible to identify an individual who could give a 
first-person account of the functioning of the appeals process as a whole. My attempts to secure 
interviews with FDIC officials were unsuccessful. I did, however, gather significant information from 
interviews of past and current OCC Ombudsmen and past and current members of the NCUA’s 
Supervisory Review Committee. See supra note 13. 
 71. About the OCC, OCC, http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
9G6Z-AETA (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). In 2011, the OCC gained regulatory authority over national 
thrifts when the Dodd-Frank Act shuttered the Office of Thrift Supervision. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5411–12 
(2012). 
 72. See Find Banks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of 
Dec. 31, 2012 and Federal Regulator as Comptroller of the Currency) (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). 
 73. See Summary of Deposits, FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/ (linking to Summary Tables, 
which provides a table for the June 30, 2012 report for the Top 50 Commercial Banks and Savings 
Institutions by Deposits). 
 74. See Find Banks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of 
Dec. 31, 2012, Size or Performance as Total Assets ($) Equal or Less Than $1,000,000,000, and 
Federal Regulator as Comptroller of the Currency) (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).  
 75. OCC, AR-2012, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, inside front cover. 
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1. OCC Appeals Process 
As discussed in Part I.B, the OCC was the first federal bank regulator 
to establish an independent MSD appeals process. Because the 
Congressional mandate was based on the OCC’s existing process,76 the 
statute did not require changes at the OCC. Since 1994, the OCC has 
updated its procedures on four occasions, but the basic structure of the 
appeals process remains the same.
77
 
Under current OCC guidelines,
78
 banks are encouraged to first attempt 
to resolve any disagreement with examiners informally during the 
examination process.
79
 If a bank is dissatisfied with informal attempts to 
resolve the disputed MSD, the bank may initiate a formal appeal with 
either the Ombudsman or the Deputy Comptroller of the supervisory 
district that oversees the bank.
80
 The choice of whether to file an appeal 
with the Ombudsman or Deputy Comptroller is left to the discretion of the 
appealing bank.
81
 Although the Deputy Comptroller oversees the 
supervisory function that led to the initial MSD,
82
 the Ombudsman 
“operates independently from the bank supervision process and reports 
directly to the Comptroller of the Currency.”83 Since the OCC established 
the MSD appeals process, it has had only two Ombudsmen: Samuel P. 
Golden (1993–2008) and Larry L. Hattix (2008–present).84 The OCC 
 
 
 76. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 77. The OCC revised the procedures in 1996, 2002, 2011, and 2013. See OCC, Independent 
Regulatory Appeals Process, 61 Fed. Reg. 7,042 (Feb. 23, 1996); National Bank Appeals Process, 
OCC Bulletin 1996-18 (Feb. 23, 1996); National Bank Appeals Process, OCC Bulletin 2002-9 (Feb. 
25, 2002); Bank Appeals Process, OCC Bulletin 2011-44 (Nov. 1, 2011); OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, 
supra note 10. 
 78. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10; OCC, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL (PPM) 
1000-9 (REVISED), ADMINISTERING BANK APPEALS (June 3, 2013) [hereinafter OCC PPM 1000-9] 
(acquired through a Freedom of Information Act request, copy on file with author); OCC, APPEALS 
PROCESS FOR NATIONAL BANKS AND FEDERAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS (2013), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/topics/dispute-resolution/bank-appeals/bank-appeals-process-brochure.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/GYQ6-E936 [hereinafter OCC BANK APPEALS PROCESS BROCHURE].  
 79. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10; OCC PPM 1000-9, supra note 78. 
 80. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. (“A formal appeal to the Deputy Comptroller shall be filed with the Deputy 
Comptroller responsible for the unit that issued the decision or action in dispute.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Press Release, OCC, The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Names Larry Hattix to 
be Ombudsman (Feb. 8, 2008), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2008/ 
nr-occ-2008-12.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3LND-BDYV. Before becoming Ombudsman both 
men had lengthy careers as OCC examiners. Id. 
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Ombudsman’s office currently has two other seasoned former examiners 
dedicated to the appeals function full-time.
85
 
Whether the bank chooses to start its appeal with the Deputy 
Comptroller or the Ombudsman, it must submit a written document fully 
describing the matter in dispute.
86
 The bank’s appeal must “include the 
supervisory standards that the bank deems were inappropriately applied by 
OCC officials.”87 The bank must also show that its board of directors has 
approved the appeal.
88
 While some institutions choose to have outside 
attorneys prepare the appeals documentation, the OCC’s process is 
designed to be simple enough that banks can pursue appeals without 
attorneys.
89
  
If a bank appeals to the Deputy Comptroller, the Deputy Comptroller 
then “contacts the bank to discuss the appeals process and applicable 
supervisory standards related to the issue(s) in dispute, and to ensure that 
he or she has all the information needed to determine if the issue(s) in 
dispute are appealable.”90 The Deputy Comptroller also contacts OCC 
examination staff to get a “written response to the appeal.”91 If the Deputy 
Comptroller or his or her supervisor “participated in making the decision 
under review, he or she must transfer the appeal to the Ombudsman.”92 
Under normal circumstances, the Deputy Comptroller will issue a written 
decision letter within forty-five days.
93
 
If the bank is unhappy with the Deputy Comptroller’s decision or 
prefers to begin the appeal with an independent party,
94
 the bank can 
appeal to the Ombudsman. Like the Deputy Comptroller, the Ombudsman 
must contact the bank to discuss the appeal and seek a response to the 
appeal from OCC examination staff.
95
 In some cases, the Ombudsman or 
 
 
 85. Hattix Interview, supra note 13. Three additional Ombudsman Office employees assist with 
the appeals function as needed. Id. The Ombudsman calls on other experts throughout the OCC to help 
with appeals on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
 86. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
 87. Id. See also OCC PPM 1000-9, supra note 78 (stating that a formal appeal should include 
“[s]upervisory standards (i.e., law citation or supervisory guidance) thought to be applied 
inaccurately”).  
 88. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
 89. Hattix Interview, supra note 13. 
 90. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Because the Deputy Comptroller oversees the examination function, some banks may fear 
retaliation is more likely if the first appeal is filed with the Deputy Comptroller. The OCC’s process 
allows these banks to bypass the Deputy Comptroller. 
 95. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
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his staff visits the appealing bank.
96
 Under normal circumstances, the 
Ombudsman will reach a decision within forty-five days of the filing of 
the appeal.
97
 
Banks may use the MSD appeals process to challenge a wide variety of 
determinations. In addition to examination ratings, allowances for loan and 
lease losses, and loan classifications (all of which are appealable under the 
statute itself),
98
 OCC guidance allows banks to appeal violations of law, 
fair-lending-related decisions, licensing decisions, and other “[m]aterial 
supervisory determinations such as matters requiring attention, compliance 
with enforcement actions, or other conclusions in the report of 
examination.”99 The OCC guidance specifically excludes some matters 
from review, including formal enforcement actions and “other agency 
decisions that are subject to judicial review other than those described in 
the” OCC guidance.100 For the purposes of the guidance, “a formal 
enforcement-related action or decision includes the underlying facts that 
form the basis of a recommended or pending formal enforcement action 
and the acts or practices that are the subject of a pending formal 
enforcement action.”101 The guidance, however, leaves open the possibility 
of appeal for informal enforcement actions (like memoranda of 
understanding) and also allows room for banks to challenge examination 
ratings and other examination conclusions while under formal 
enforcement actions.
102
  
 
 
 96. Hattix Interview, supra note 13 (“There have been . . . occasions when sometimes I will visit 
[the appealing bank] if I think that that’s appropriate. There’s times also when the banks have asked if 
they can come in, and we always allow that. . . . [B]ut it’s not the majority. It’s the minority.”). In 
contrast Mr. Hattix’s predecessor, Ombudsman Samuel P. Golden, reports that he or his staff nearly 
always visited appealing banks. He explains: 
Most of the time, if I want to know how you live, I’m going to go to your house. You can tell 
me about how you live, and then I go to your house and it is junky as hell. You know, 
seriously. If you want to know the real facts, you literally go. So ninety-five percent of the 
time we went to the bank. 
Golden Interview, supra note 13. 
 97. Hattix Interview, supra note 13 (“[O]ur goal is to try and get things resolved within forty-five 
days. Right now we are probably averaging probably closer to sixty, and I think that that has to do with 
the types of cases that we are getting right now with the economy being what it is.”). See also OCC 
BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
 98. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(f)(1)(A) (2012).  
 99. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
 100. Id. Additionally, banks may not appeal decisions to close a bank, preliminary conclusions 
that have not yet been finalized, formal or informal rulemaking, formal or informal adjudications 
under the Administrative Procedures Act, or FOIA decisions. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. (“While banks may not appeal a decision by the supervisory office to pursue a formal 
enforcement-related action, banks may appeal conclusions in the [report of examination].”); Hattix 
Interview, supra note 13 (“[I]f you’re under an enforcement agreement and that’s what you are 
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2015] WHEN BANK EXAMINERS GET IT WRONG 1119 
 
 
 
 
Once a bank submits an appeal, the Deputy Comptroller or the 
Ombudsman has seven days to determine whether the appeal concerns an 
appealable matter.
103
 Ombudsman Hattix urges all banks with examination 
complaints to bring them to the Ombudsman.
104
 He believes the OCC’s 
authority on appeal is often broader than banks believe.
105
 In the event the 
matter is not considered an MSD, the Ombudsman may still be able to 
serve as an informal mediator between the bank and the OCC’s 
examination staff.
106
  
Banks cannot use the appeals process to delay compliance with a 
formal enforcement action. According to OCC guidance: 
As a general matter, decisions and actions in dispute are not stayed 
during the pursuit of an appeal. In the appropriate circumstances, 
however, the Ombudsman or the appropriate OCC official, upon 
written request of a bank, may relieve the bank of the obligation to 
comply with a supervisory decision or action while the supervisory 
appeal is pending.
107
  
Ombudsman Hattix explains that, although the Ombudsman’s Office has 
issued stays, stays are generally only appropriate when the appealing bank 
would suffer irreparable harm by complying with the supervisory 
decision.
108
 
OCC guidance does not provide a clear standard of review for the 
Ombudsman or Deputy Comptroller in deciding appeals. The guidance 
notes that when a bank appeals conclusions in a report of examination 
while subject to a formal enforcement action, “the appeal is limited to a 
consideration of whether the examiners appropriately applied agency 
policies and standards.”109 The guidance is otherwise silent about the 
standard of review. 
Other OCC statements are ambiguous about the standard of review for 
MSD appeals. An OCC brochure provided to bankers and examiners 
 
 
appealing, the enforcement document itself, then we could probably say, ‘Yeah, that’s probably not 
going to be appealable.’ But a lot of times, the underlying factors, you know, your ratings, you can still 
appeal.”). 
 103. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
 104. Hattix Interview, supra note 13. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
 108. Hattix Interview, supra note 13 (explaining that if an MSD had instructed a bank to 
reimburse customers for fair lending violations, a stay might be appropriate while the Ombudsman 
reviewed the violation). 
 109. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
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explains that the “Ombudsman provides an independent and objective 
review to determine if supervisory decisions are reasonable based on 
available facts.”110 It also notes that “[e]xaminers can be assured that fair, 
impartial review of appeals will support reasonable decisions based on 
available facts according to existing standards and guidance.”111 Perhaps 
this means the Deputy Comptroller and the Ombudsman decide only 
whether examiner decisions are within a range of reasonableness—
something less than a full de novo review of the facts underlying the 
dispute and the determinations of the examination staff. 
Former OCC Ombudsman Samuel P. Golden appears to have taken the 
position that because statutes, regulations, and guidelines did not explicitly 
narrow the standard of review, he was free to reconsider all findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. Ombudsman Golden explained that, in 
general, he employed a de novo standard of review.
112
 He was free to 
make a new determination—including a determination that was harsher 
than the one reached in the initial examination. On most occasions, Mr. 
Golden and his staff would visit the bank to make their own assessment of 
underlying facts.
113
  
Current Ombudsman Larry L. Hattix does not use the phrase de novo 
when describing the MSD standard of review. Instead, he describes his 
decisions as “standard based.”114 For example, if a bank were appealing a 
loan classification, he would ask both the bank and the examination staff 
to explain how the loan complies with the OCC’s standards for classifying 
loans. The Ombudsman would then “look at the standards and say, ‘Was it 
applied appropriately or not?’”115 Under this approach Mr. Hattix explains 
that he is “not giving deference to either side.”116 On the one hand Mr. 
 
 
 110. OCC BANK APPEALS PROCESS BROCHURE, supra note 78. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Golden Interview, supra note 13 (“Most appeals were de novo, which means this: If you 
appeal it, what you are asking for is a reassessment of the facts and circumstances and a decision that 
you believe is fair and balanced. And so what I had was the opportunity to go back and not be bound 
by the decision that the exam team had made. And that ‘not being bound by’ means that I could 
change it in any way that we believed that our analysis, the facts and circumstances were that led to the 
decision.”).  
 113. Id. While Ombudsman Golden reviewed most appeals de novo, he used a more limited 
standard of review for appeals involving banks with formal enforcement actions. Id. In those cases, the 
Ombudsman had to “take the same facts and circumstances that the exam team had,” and then 
determine whether the examiners’ decisions “were consistent with the examination guidelines.” Id. 
The OCC’s review of findings related to enforcement action is more limited now. See OCC BULLETIN 
2013–15, supra note 10; Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 53 (testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig, 
Founder & CEO, Promontory Financial Group, LLC). 
 114. Hattix Interview, supra note 13. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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Hattix’s review seems the equivalent of a de novo standard: the 
Ombudsman looks at the facts and makes his own determination about 
how those facts comport with OCC regulations and policies rather than 
relying on the initial factfinder’s (the examiner’s) conclusions of law. On 
the other hand, this description makes no mention of how the Ombudsman 
might resolve questions of fact. Without a visit to the bank, the 
Ombudsman may have little way of resolving questions of fact without 
giving deference to earlier factfinders. Perhaps cases involving questions 
of fact are rare instances that are resolved de novo by the Ombudsman by 
visiting the bank. However, Ombudsman Golden often visited banks, but 
Ombudsman Hattix rarely does so.
117
 Perhaps the fewer visits suggest that 
Ombudsman Hattix uses a different standard than Ombudsman Golden did 
when reviewing factual disputes.
118
 
Regardless of the standard of review, once the Ombudsman has 
reached a decision, he issues a written response to both the bank and the 
examination staff.
119
 The Ombudsman also publishes summaries of each 
decision.
120
 This disclosure is meant to “provide transparency and 
openness in [the OCC’s] decision-making process,”121 while still 
maintaining the confidentiality of the appealing bank and its customers.
122
  
The OCC appeals guidelines include a process designed to discourage 
examiner retaliation. After an appeal, the Ombudsman must contact the 
bank twice to ask whether retaliation has occurred.
123
 If a bank reports 
retaliation, the Ombudsman investigates.
124
 “If the Ombudsman finds that 
retaliation has occurred, he or she will forward the complaint directly to 
the Inspector General.”125 Ombudsman Hattix reported that, on a few 
occasions, he has forwarded complaints to the Inspector General for 
 
 
 117. See supra note 96. 
 118. The OCC guidance does not provide distinctions between a Deputy Comptroller appeal and 
an Ombudsman appeal that suggest these officials might employ a different standard of review. See 
OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. However, because I did not interview any Deputy 
Comptrollers, it is hard to know whether they approach appeals like the Ombudsmen.  
 119. Id. 
 120. See infra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 121. Rachel Witkowski, OCC’s Ombudsman Opposes Appeal Reform Bill, AM. BANKER, Apr. 19, 
2012, available at 2012 WLNR 8174226 (quoting OCC Ombudsman Larry L. Hattix). 
 122. Golden Interview, supra note 13 (noting that, while it was usually possible to preserve 
confidentiality while still having meaningful disclosure, occasionally “the summaries had to be 
neutered to the point where it was difficult to” fully describe the appeal). 
 123. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10 (“The Ombudsman will contact bank management 
(1) 60 days after the date of the decision letter and (2) 60 days after the completion of the first 
examination of the appellant bank following its appeal.”). Banks may also contact the Ombudsman 
about retaliation at their convenience. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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further investigation.
126
 The OCC guidance warns that “[a]ppropriate 
action, including disciplinary action consistent with OCC policies, will be 
taken as warranted.”127 The Ombudsman also has authority to 
“recommend to the Comptroller that the next examination of the bank 
exclude personnel involved in the ruling appealed by the bank.”128 
2. OCC Appeals 
Banks supervised by the OCC may file an initial appeal with either the 
Ombudsman or the Deputy Comptroller of the supervisory district that 
oversees the bank.
129
 The OCC does not provide any public information 
about Deputy Comptroller appeals. Through FOIA, I requested 
information on Deputy Comptroller appeals since January 1, 1993. In 
response, I received a list summarizing 11 appeals.
130
 Of those appeals, 4 
involved examination findings, and 3 involved composite and component 
ratings. There was 1 appeal each for a licensing decision, a supervisory 
letter, a Community Reinvestment Act rating, and a loan classification. Of 
the 11 appeals, 6 upheld the examiner decision, 2 reversed the examiner 
decision, 2 partially reversed the examiner decision, and 1 appeal was 
withdrawn. Only 3 Deputy Comptroller decisions were appealed to the 
Ombudsman. 
These FOIA data appear incomplete. The earliest decision included in 
the list of Deputy Comptroller appeals is dated 2002.
131
 It is unlikely there 
were no appeals prior to 2002. Indeed, 3 Ombudsman opinions in 1994 
and 1 in 2000 indicate that they were appeals from Deputy Comptroller 
decisions. Data for later appeals may also be incomplete.
132
  
 
 
 126. Hattix Interview, supra note 13. 
 127. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. Ombudsman Hattix explains that disciplinary action 
might be taken by either the Inspector General or the Ombudsman. Hattix Interview, supra note 13. 
 128. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10 (noting that “[t]he Comptroller will make the final 
decision on any such exclusion”). 
 129. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. 
 130. Letter from Frank D. Vance, Jr., Manager, Disclosure Services & FOIA Officer, OCC to 
author (Feb. 28, 2014) (on file with author). 
 131. The letter accompanying the appeals list explains: “Our Deputy Comptroller Offices were 
unable to locate any documents showing evidence of any appeals at their level prior to June 2002.” Id. 
In response to a prior FOIA request for the same documents, the OCC advised that “some underlying 
documents from the 1990s would have been destroyed through our normal destruction schedules.” 
Letter from Frank D. Vance, Jr., Manager, Disclosure Service & FOIA Officer, OCC to author (Aug. 
21, 2013) (on file with author). 
 132. Current OCC Ombudsman Larry L. Hattix estimates that 20% of appeals originate with a 
Deputy Comptroller. Hattix Interview, supra note 13. There were 58 Ombudsman appeals between 
2002 and 2012. See infra Figure 1. The 11 Deputy Comptroller appeals would be less than 20% of the 
total number of appeals during that time. 
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Information about bank appeals filed directly with the Ombudsman is 
more plentiful and reliable. As previously mentioned, the OCC publishes 
summaries of each Ombudsman opinion. Initially the OCC published the 
summaries in quarterly journals and annual reports.
133
 With the advent of 
the Internet, the OCC now posts summaries on its webpage.
134
 The 
remainder of this section summarizes data I gathered from these 
sources.
135
  
The OCC’s Ombudsman decided 157 appeals between 1994 and 2012. 
On average this would amount to about 9 appeals per year, but the number 
of appeals per year was not constant during this time period.  
 
 
 133. See, e.g., Appeals Process, 13 OCC Q.J., no. 1, 1993–1994, at 61, 61–66; OCC REPORT OF 
THE OMBUDSMAN 1995–1996, at 23–184 (1997).  
 134. See Bank Appeals Summaries, OCC, http://www.occ.gov/topics/dispute-resolution/bank-
appeals/summaries/index-summaries.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). Due to the workload in the 
Ombudsman’s Office, it currently takes about 90 to 120 days after the decision for the summary to 
appear on the Internet. Hattix Interview, supra note 13. 
 135. To provide the OCC Ombudsman appeals data contained in this section, I reviewed and 
classified all of the appeals summaries from the OCC annual reports, the OCC Quartelry Journal, and 
the OCC Intranet. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text (describing these sources).The 
printed and Internet sources contained minor discrepancies. When sources conflicted, I relied on the 
printed source. 
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FIGURE 1: OCC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS 
OMBUDSMAN APPEALS PER YEAR (1994–2012) 
 
As Figure 1 shows, there were many more appeals during the early 
years of the OCC’s Ombudsman’s Office. Economic conditions136 may 
partly explain the generally larger number of appeals in the 1990s. These 
early appeals may also evidence pent-up demand for an appeals process. 
They may also reflect Ombudsman Golden’s efforts to market the new 
appeals process.
137
  
Appeals then fell to an historic low of 2 in 2004, before slightly 
increasing in recent years. The recent uptick in appeals corresponds with 
the financial crisis that began in 2008. Economic downturns may lead to 
more appeals either because financial conditions result in harsher MSDs, 
or because regulators increase their scrutiny, or both. The overall decline 
in appeals over the life of the appeals process could be partly explained by 
the significant consolidation in banking between 1994 and 2012. The OCC 
 
 
 136. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 137. Ombudsman Golden explained: “I traveled, the first year, over 200,000 miles making sure 
that everyone understood—that no one was fearful of [the appeals] process . . . .” Golden Interview, 
supra note 13. He credited the early number of appeals with this communication strategy. Id. 
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regulated 3602 banks at the beginning of 1993.
138
 By the end of 2012, that 
number had dropped to 1783.
139
 Whatever the reason, there are fewer 
appeals now than in the 1990s. 
Because the summary decisions were crafted to protect the identity of 
the appealing bank and its customers, little information is available about 
which banks utilize the appeals process. Many of the appeals give no 
indication as to the size or type of bank appealing. Others provide general 
information: 29 described the appealing bank as “small” or as a 
“community bank”; 10 described the appealing bank as “large”; and 4 
described the appealing bank as a “limited-purpose” bank. Ombudsman 
Hattix estimates that “maybe two-thirds of the appeals are [brought by] 
community banks.”140 A report prepared by the Department of the 
Treasury Office of Inspector General stated that “community banks filed 
22 formal appeals from 2007 to 2011.”141  
The MSDs at issue vary widely from appeal to appeal. Figure 2 
summarizes the issues that generated at least 5 Ombudsman appeals. Many 
appeals involved more than one issue. Of the 47 appeals involving the 
CAMELS ratings, the composite rating was most often appealed (37 
times). The management rating followed closely (32 times). Capital (22), 
assets (21), earnings (19), liquidity (14), and sensitivity to market risk (11) 
ratings were appealed less often. Again, it was common for a single appeal 
to challenge more than one rating. Because the composite and 
management ratings are often identified as the more subjective of the 
CAMELS ratings,
142
 it is not surprising that they were appealed more 
often. 
 
 
 138. Find Banks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of 
Dec. 31, 1992 and Federal Regulator as Comptroller of the Currency) (last visited Feb. 25, 2015)  
 139. See id. (search with Information as of Dec. 31, 2012 and Federal Regulator as Comptroller of 
the Currency). 
 140. Hattix Interview, supra note 13. 
 141. OCC OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 11 (this number includes appeals filed with both the 
Ombudsman and the appropriate Deputy Comptroller). 
 142. See, e.g., Joe Adler, Why Camels Aren’t as Secret as You Think, AM. BANKER, Aug. 15, 
2011, at 1 (“[M]ost agree it is impossible to replicate the official ratings exactly, since the regulators 
likely include highly subjective information about individual institutions in determining a Camels 
score. One crucial element of the rating system is the quality of a bank’s management, which is not 
necessarily quantifiable.”); Kathryn Reed Edge, Anatomy of a Bank Failure, TENN. B.J., Apr. 2012, at 
25 (“The composite is not an average of the other ratings and is sometimes highly subjective.”). 
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FIGURE 2: OCC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS APPEALED 
TO OMBUDSMAN (1994–2012) 
Reason for Appeal Number 
CAMELS Composite or Component Ratings 47 
Loan or Asset Classifications 27 
Community Reinvestment Act Exam Ratings or Conclusions 24 
Issues Related to a Formal or Informal Enforcement Actions 17 
Accounting Issues 15 
Unprofessional, Abusive, or Retaliatory Examiner Conduct 13 
Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses 10 
Insider Lending / Regulation O 10 
Consumer Compliance Exam Ratings or Conclusions 9 
Designation of the Bank as “Troubled” 8 
Lending Limit Rules 8 
Determination that Bank Must Amend Its Call Report 6 
Truth in Lending Act / Regulation Z 6 
 
Not all of the appeals seeking a change in a CAMELS rating disclosed 
the rating the bank had received, but many did. A three-rating was the 
most likely to prompt an appeal. Seventy-nine of the CAMELS composite 
or component ratings appealed were three-ratings. In comparison, 12 two-
ratings were appealed, 32 four-ratings were appealed, and 17 five-ratings 
were appealed. 
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FIGURE 3: OUTCOMES OF OCC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATION 
APPEALS TO OMBUDSMAN (1994–2012) 
 
Banks seldom win appeals. The Ombudsman has upheld 57% (90/157) 
of the examiner decisions. In contrast, the appealing bank was the clear 
winner in only 20% (31/157) of the appeals. Although the success rate of 
appeals has fluctuated from year to year, the generally low number of 
appeals makes it impossible to glean any meaningful trends from the 
yearly data. 
B. Federal Reserve 
The Federal Reserve System is probably best known as the central 
bank of the United States.
143
 However, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, along with twelve regional Federal Reserve 
Banks (collectively the “Federal Reserve”), supervises and examines 
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve.
144
 A bank becomes a 
member of the Federal Reserve by application and by purchasing stock in 
 
 
 143. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 99TH ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 1 (2013).  
 144. See id.  
Other (4)
Reversed (31)
Mixed (32)
Upheld (90)
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the Federal Reserve Bank in its district.
145
 While all nationally chartered 
banks must be members of the Federal Reserve,
146
 the OCC is primarily 
responsible for supervising and examining those banks.
147
 Thus, the 
Federal Reserve focuses its supervisory attention on state-chartered banks 
that have chosen to become members of the Federal Reserve.
148
 In 2012, 
there were 843 state-chartered member banks.
149
 The Federal Reserve 
coordinates examinations of these institutions with state banking 
regulators.
150
 
The Federal Reserve also has supervisory authority over bank holding 
companies and savings and loan holding companies.
151
 In 2012 there were 
5088 bank holding companies and 689 savings and loan holding 
companies.
152
 While some of these holding companies are massive and 
complex,
153
 many are small and engage in little business other than 
owning financial institution stock.
154
 For this reason, the Federal Reserve 
does not conduct on-site inspections of all holding companies annually.
155
 
In 2012, the Federal Reserve conducted 200 on-site inspections of bank 
holding companies with less than $1 billion in assets and repeatedly 
inspected the largest bank holding companies.
156
 There were 4108 Federal 
 
 
 145. 12 U.S.C. §§ 222, 321 (2012). 
 146. Id. § 222. 
 147. See supra Part II.A. 
 148. See 12 U.S.C. § 325 (2012); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 99TH ANNUAL 
REPORT 2013, at 51-52 (2013). 
 149. See Find Banks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of 
Dec. 31, 2012 and Federal Regulator as Federal Reserve Board) (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). 
 150. FEDERAL RESERVE EXAM MANUAL, supra note 36 § 1000.1 (“Under the alternate-year 
examination program, those banks that qualify are examined in alternate examination cycles by the 
Reserve Bank and the state.”). 
 151. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1844, 1467a (2012). See also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
99TH ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 51 (2013) (“The Federal Reserve also has responsibility for 
supervising the operations of all Edge Act and agreement corporations, the international operations of 
state member banks and U.S. [bank holding companies], and the U.S. operations of foreign banking 
organizations.”). 
 152. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 99TH ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 56 (2013). 
 153. For example, the four largest bank holding companies each have total assets exceeding $1 
billion. Holding Companies with Assets Greater than $10 Billion, Federal Reserve System National 
Information Center, http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2QLD-G5RU (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
 154. See FEDERAL RESERVE EXAM MANUAL, supra note 36, § 2060.2 (noting the existence of 
“small shell” holding companies that do not have “formal written budgets or [financial] plans”).  
 155. See Div. of Banking Supervision & Regulation, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Supervisory Letter 02-1, Revisions to Bank Holding Company Supervision Procedures for 
Organizations with Total Consolidated Assets of $5 Billion or Less (Jan. 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2002/sr0201.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/484W-
26WA. 
 156. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 99TH ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 53 tbl.1 
(2013). 
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Reserve employees whose responsibilities focused on supervision and 
regulation of financial institutions and the Federal Reserve expected these 
ranks to increase.
157
  
1. Federal Reserve Appeals Process 
Following Congress’s passage of the Riegle Community Development 
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, the Federal Reserve Board 
issued guidelines for appealing MSDs.
158
 These Board guidelines are still 
in effect today and are broad enough to allow appeals by not only state-
chartered member banks but also bank holding companies and other 
entities that are subject to the Federal Reserve’s examination or inspection 
authority.
159
 By having agencywide guidelines, the Federal Reserve Board 
sought to ensure that all institutions receive “the same appellant rights 
regardless of the Federal Reserve district in which they reside.”160 The 
Board guidelines themselves, however, were designed to “allow each 
Reserve Bank to administer its own appellate process.”161 The guidelines 
seemed to contemplate that each regional Reserve Bank would adopt 
additional policies governing appeals of MSDs.
162
 Most have done so,
163
 
 
 
 157. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL REPORT: BUDGET REVIEW 2013, at 
37 tbl.B.3, 42 tbl.C.4 (2013) (noting that there were 383 supervision employees at the Board of 
Governors and 3725 supervision employees at the regional Federal Reserve Banks). 
 158. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470 (Mar. 30, 1995). 
 159. Id. at 16,473. 
 160. Id. at 16,472. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 16,473 (“Each Reserve Bank shall make these guidelines and the Reserve Bank’s 
process for selecting a review panel available to each institution in its district, any institution appealing 
a material supervisory determination, and any member of the public who requests them.”). 
 163. FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, PROCEDURES FOR APPEALS OF MATERIAL SUPERVISORY 
DETERMINATIONS (2010), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/banking/sr/FRBATL_ 
Appeals%20_Proc_030210.pdf [hereinafter FRB ATLANTA APPEALS]; FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
BOSTON, APPEALS PROCESS: GUIDELINES FOR APPEALS OF MATERIAL SUPERVISORY 
DETERMINATIONS, available at http://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/supinfo/appeals-process.htm (last 
updated Oct. 15, 2009) [hereinafter FRB BOSTON APPEALS]; FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, 
PROCEDURES FOR APPEALING MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS, available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/banking/membership/smb/AppealProcedures.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4JZX-UWXD (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) [hereinafter FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS]; 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, PROCEDURES FOR APPEALING MATERIAL SUPERVISORY 
DETERMINATIONS (2014), available at https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/banking/ 
srcappealsprocedures020114final.pdf?la=en [hereinafter FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS]; FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF NEW YORK, PROCEDURES FOR APPEALS OF ADVERSE MATERIAL SUPERVISORY 
DETERMINATIONS, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/pdf/appeals_procedures.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6BUX-HVHV (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) [hereinafter FRB NEW YORK 
APPEALS]; FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, POLICY STATEMENT ON APPEALS OF MATERIAL 
SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS (2014) [hereinafter FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS], available at 
http://www.phil.frb.org/bank-resources/supervision-and-regulation/appeals-policy/AppealPolicy.pdf, 
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but my research and FOIA request failed to yield appeals policies for the 
Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland, Chicago, and St. Louis.
164
 
At the Federal Reserve, financial institutions dissatisfied with an MSD 
may file a written appeal with the “Secretary of the Reserve Bank or other 
appropriate Reserve Bank official.”165 The appeal must be approved by the 
institution’s board of directors and must “contain all the facts and 
arguments that the institution wishes to present.”166 When a Federal 
Reserve Bank receives an appeal, it must forward a copy to staff of the 
Federal Reserve Board.
167
 The MSD that is the subject of the appeal 
remains in effect during the appeals process.
168
 
According to the Board guidelines, the initial appeal is considered “by 
a person or persons selected by the Reserve Bank . . . who . . . did not 
participate in the material supervisory determination[,] do not directly or 
indirectly report to the person who made the material supervisory 
determination under review[,] and . . . are qualified to review the material 
supervisory determination.”169 Some Reserve Banks’ policies specify that 
the review panel should consist of at least three individuals who are 
appointed by the Federal Reserve Bank Office in Charge of Supervision 
and Regulation.
170
 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke 
 
 
archived at http://perma.cc/46SM-WD79; FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, POLICY STATEMENT 
ON APPEALS OF MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS (2012), available at http://www.richmond 
fed.org/banking/supervision_and_regulation/pdf/policy_statement_on_appeals.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/R669-R65G [hereinafter FRB RICHMOND APPEALS]; FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, POLICY STATEMENT ON APPEALS OF MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS (2013), 
available at http://www.frbsf.org/banking-supervision/regulation/appeals-policy/FRBSF-Appeals-
Policy.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9GPZ-BBLU [hereinafter FRB SAN FRANCISCO APPEALS]. 
 164. A 2012 Federal Reserve Office of Inspector General audit of the community bank 
examination process “found that all 12 Reserve Banks have established appeals policies that follow 
Board guidance.” FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 24. To gather such policies, I 
made a FOIA request to the Federal Reserve for all “policies currently in effect for handling . . . 
appeals of material supervisory determinations.” See E-mail from author to [Federal Reserve] FOIA 
Requests (May 27, 2013) (on file with author). The Federal Reserve’s response did not contain policies 
from the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, or St. Louis. See E-mail from Denise 
Harris, FOIA Office, Federal Reserve Board to author (June 10, 2013) (on file with author). I 
telephoned the Federal Reserve’s FOIA Office and confirmed that no policies were available for these 
Reserve Banks. Telephone call with Denise Harris, FOIA Office, Federal Reserve Board (June 21, 
2013). Later I found a copy of the Boston guidelines online. See FRB BOSTON APPEALS, supra note 
163. 
 165. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,472 (Mar. 30, 1995). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 16,473. 
 169. Id. at 16,472. 
 170. See FRB ATLANTA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 2 (providing for a three person review 
panel); FRB BOSTON APPEALS, supra note 163 (“A Review Panel, composed of three department 
representatives and selected by the SR&C Officer; or three officers/managers from other districts will 
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explained that these “review panels” are “selected after consultation with 
staff at the [Federal Reserve] Board in Washington.”171 The review panels 
are often composed of employees from Reserve Banks other than the 
Reserve Bank that handled the examination.
172
 This process means that the 
initial review panels are created on an ad hoc basis and vary in makeup 
from appeal to appeal. 
An institution submitting an appeal is entitled to appear in person 
before the review panel.
173
 The review panel may choose to allow the 
institution to present witnesses.
174
 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
specifically allows the institution to be represented by counsel and notes 
that allowed witnesses might include accountants and other experts.
175
 It 
also notes that in some instances the review panel may request that 
examination staff participate in or present testimony at the hearing.
176
 
Most regional Reserve Banks’ policies provide for transcribing or 
recording the proceedings.
177
 
 
 
be established to review the appeal.”); FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note 163, § IV.B 
(specifying that a review panel consists of three or five individuals); FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra 
note 163, at IV.B (stating that the reserve panel must contain at least three individuals);. But see FRB 
KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supra note 163, at 4 (stating that the size of the panel should be determined 
“in light of the nature of the appeal, availability of independent qualified officers and staff, and other 
factors deemed relevant by the Appropriate Reserve Bank Official”); FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS, 
supra note 163, at 3 (stating that the size of the panel should be determined “in light of the nature of 
the appeal, availability of independent qualified officers and staff, and other factors deemed relevant 
by the Officer in Charge of Supervision”); FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supra note 163, § 7(a) (stating 
that the review panel must consist of at least one individual); FRB SAN FRANCISCO APPEALS, supra 
note 163, at 3 (failing to specify the number of individuals on a review panel). 
 171. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Future 
of Community Banking Conference: Community Banking (Feb. 16, 2012), available at 2012 WL 
523933. 
 172. FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 22 (“According to Board staff, members 
of the independent panel are often selected from other Reserve Banks to ensure their independence.”). 
See also FRB BOSTON APPEALS, supra note 163 (noting that the panel may consist of “three 
officers/managers from other districts”); FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note 163, § IV.B (stating 
that the review panel may consist of “officers or senior staff of the [Federal] Reserve Bank [of 
Philadelphia]” or “officers or senior staff that are othersize employed by the Federal Reserve 
System”).  
 173. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,472 (Mar. 30, 1995). 
 174. Id. 
 175. FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supra note 163, § 9(a). 
 176. Id. § 9(c). 
 177. Some Federal Reserve Banks’ policies allow the review panel to determine whether a 
transcript or recording is made. FRB ATLANTA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 3; FRB PHILADELPHIA 
APPEALS, supra note 163, § V.B.5.d; FRB SAN FRANCISCO APPEALS, supra note 163, at 5. Other 
Federal Reserve Banks’ policies require a transcript or recording. FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supra 
note 163, at 6; FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra note 163, § V.B.5.d; FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supra 
note 163, § 9(d); FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS, supra note 163, § 6(d). 
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As an initial matter, the review panel must decide whether the 
institution’s complaint falls within the scope of appealable MSDs.178 The 
Federal Reserve Board guidelines state that “[t]he term ‘material 
supervisory determination’ includes, but is not limited to, material 
determinations relating to examination or inspection composite ratings, the 
adequacy of loan loss reserves and significant loan classifications.”179 The 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s policy adds that an appeal “may 
cover any type of examination, including safety and soundness, trust, 
transfer agent, electronic data processing, consumer compliance, and 
CRA.”180 Institutions may not use the MSD appeals process to challenge 
prompt corrective action directives, enforcement actions, or capital 
directives.
181
 If the review panel concludes that the matter is not subject to 
appeal, the institution can appeal that decision in the same way it could 
appeal a decision on the merits of the appeal.
182
 
If the review panel concludes the matter is appealable, it then turns its 
attention to the merits of the appeal. The Board guidelines provide no 
guidance on the standards the review panel should use in evaluating the 
appeal.
183
 Regional Reserve Banks have filled this void with conflicting 
policies. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York allows the most robust 
review, stating that “[t]he Review Panel will use a ‘de novo’ standard of 
review in reaching its decision.”184 On the other hand, the Federal Reserve 
of Kansas City states that the review panel has the power to determine the 
standard of review.
185
 “Generally, the standard of review will focus on 
whether the Reserve Bank’s findings and conclusions are based on 
sufficient evidence and are consistent with [Federal Reserve System] 
policy.”186 The Kansas City Reserve Bank’s policies explicitly state that 
“[i]n most cases, a de novo review will not be undertaken.”187 Until 2014, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis used a standard of review 
identical to the Kansas City standard.
188
 However, the Minneapolis 
 
 
 178. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,473 (Mar. 30, 1995). 
 179. Id. 
 180. FRB SAN FRANCISCO APPEALS, supra note 163, at 2. 
 181. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,473 (Mar. 30, 1995). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.  
 184. FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supra note 163, § 10(a). 
 185. FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supra note 163, at 6 (“The Appeal Panel will then determine 
such administrative items as its standard for review.”).  
 186. FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supra note 163, at 6.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Procedures for Appealing Material Supervisory 
Determinations 7 (2004). 
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Reserve Bank amended its policy to provide: “The standard for review 
will be whether the Reserve Bank’s findings and conclusions were based 
on sufficient evidence and were consistent with FRS policy.”189 The 
Minneapolis policy emphasizes that “[a] completely new (de novo) review 
will not be undertaken.”190 The remaining regional Reserve Bank’s 
policies do not directly address the standard of review.
191
 Given this lack 
of clarity, it seems the standard of review employed can vary widely 
depending on the location of the institution, the makeup of the review 
panel, and other unexplained factors deemed important by the review 
panel. 
Once the review panel reaches a conclusion, it must prepare a written 
decision.
192
 The decision should summarize the factual and legal basis for 
the panel’s conclusions.193 The review panel sends the written decision to 
the institution.
194
 Regional Reserve Bank policies also require that the 
decision be sent to Federal Reserve staff members who oversee the 
institution’s examinations or inspections, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve, and any relevant state regulators.
195
 Ordinarily, the 
review panel should reach a decision “within 30 calendar days of the filing 
of an informationally complete appeal.”196 
The institution, with the consent of its board of directors, may appeal 
the review panel’s decision to the regional Reserve Bank President.197 As 
with the initial appeal, this secondary appeal should contain “all facts and 
arguments that the institution wishes to be considered.”198 The Board 
 
 
 189.  FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS, supra note 163, at 4.  
 190. Id.  
 191. The policies of the Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia and Richmond state that the 
written decision should “set forth the basis for the Review Panel’s conclusions, including the scope of 
the review.” FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 8; FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra 
note 163, § V.C.1.  
 192. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,472 (Mar. 30, 1995). 
 193. See, e.g., FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supra note 163, at 7 (“The written decision will 
include a memorandum outlining the basis for the Appeal Panel’s conclusions, including appropriate 
citations of legal authority or [Federal Reserve System] policies and documentation provided by the 
Appellant or the Reserve Bank.”).  
 194. See, e.g., FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note 163, § V.C.2. 
 195. See, e.g., FRB ATLANTA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 3.  
 196. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,472. Federal Reserve Bank 
policies generally provide that an appeal is not considered “informationally complete” until any 
requested hearing has been held. See, e.g., FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra note 163, § V.B.3. 
 197. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,472. The Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York’s policy provides that the second level of appeal may be heard by the Federal 
Reserve Bank “President or his or her appointed delegate (e.g., the [Federal Reserve Bank’s] 
Management Committee).” FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supra note 163, § 11(a). 
 198. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,472. 
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guidelines provide little guidance on this stage other than to note that the 
President should issue a written decision to the institution within “30 
calendar days of the filing of an informationally complete appeal.”199  
Regional Reserve Bank policies on this second level of appeal are scant 
and varied. Some policies focus on the mechanics of the review. For 
example, some policies provide that the Reserve Bank President should 
obtain a record of the initial appeal and should allow supervisory staff an 
opportunity to respond to any new claims raised by the institution.
200
 Only 
the Federal Reserve Banks of Kansas City and Minneapolis attempt to 
address the standard of review, and they provide the Federal Reserve Bank 
President with complete discretion to determine the standard and scope of 
the review.
201
  
If the financial institution is still dissatisfied, it can appeal “to the 
appropriate [Federal Reserve Board] Governor by filing a written appeal 
with the Secretary of the Board.”202 Currently, Federal Reserve Governor 
Daniel K. Tarullo is tasked with handling such appeals.
203
 The Governor is 
instructed to “consult with the director of the appropriate division of the 
Board of Governors” and reach a written decision “within 60 calendar 
days of the filing of an informationally complete appeal.”204 The Board 
guidelines do not discuss the standard of review the Governor should use 
in deciding the appeal.
205
 
The Board guidelines require that each regional Reserve Bank adopt 
“safeguards to protect appellants from retaliation.”206 Most policies state 
that Federal Reserve staff who retaliate against institutions will be 
disciplined.
207
 Four Reserve Banks prevent examination staff who 
 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 9; FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra note 
163, § VI.C.2; FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS, supra note 163, at 6. 
 201. FRB KANSAS CITY APPEALS, supra note 163, at 8 (“The President Specific standards for 
review are not set, but rather the President may base his/her decision on whatever facts and 
information the President deems relevant under the circumstances.”; FRB MINNEAPOLIS APPEALS, 
supra note 163, at 6 (“There is no specific standard of review; rather, the President may base his/her 
decision on whatever facts and information the President deems relevant under the circumstances.”). 
 202. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,473. 
 203. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Speech at the 
Future of Community Banking Conference: Community Banking (Feb. 16, 2012), available at 2012 
WL 523933. 
 204. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,473. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. 
 207. See, e.g., FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra note 163, § VIII.B. 
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participated in the appealed decisions from participating in the institution’s 
next exam and allow for longer exclusions on a case-by-case basis.
208
 
The Board guidelines also assign the Federal Reserve’s Ombudsman a 
role in discouraging retaliatory behavior by examiners. The Ombudsman 
must contact appealing institutions twice—once “six months after an 
appeal as been decided” and once “six months after the date of the next 
examination” to ask whether the institution has been subject to 
retaliation.
209
 Institutions can contact the Ombudsman with a complaint of 
retaliation at any time.
210
 
2. Federal Reserve Appeals 
The Federal Reserve does not publicly release appeals decisions in any 
form. My FOIA requests for appeals decisions since 1994 yielded a table 
summarizing each appeal filed between 2001 and 2012.
211
 For each 
appeal, the Federal Reserve provided the date of the initial appeal, the 
reason for the appeal, the level of the appeal, and a summary of the 
outcome of the appeal. Because the Federal Reserve did not provide any of 
the underlying appeals decisions, it is impossible for me to confirm its 
characterization of the reason for and outcome of each appeal. Thus, the 
remander of this section reports FOIA-gathered data as characterized by 
the Federal Reserve.
212
  
 
 
 208. See FRB ATLANTA APPEALS, supra note 163, at 4; FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra note 
163, at 10; FRB RICHMOND APPEALS, supra note 163, at VIII.A; FRB SAN FRANCISCO APPEALS, 
supra note 163, at 7. Other Reserve Banks’ policies specify that protections are crafted based on the 
circumstances of the case by the review panel or other Reserve Bank officials. FRB KANSAS CITY 
APPEALS, supra note 163, at 9–10; FRB NEW YORK APPEALS, supra note 163, § 12(b). 
 209. Ombudsman Policy Statement, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/ombpolicy.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZW4-VPR4 
(last updated Feb. 20, 2014). See also Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 
16,473 (“The Board’s Ombudsman will periodically contact institutions after their appeals have been 
decided in order to make certain that no retaliation has occurred.”). 
 210. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,473. 
 211. Letter from Margaret McCloskey Shanks, Assoc. Sec’y of the Bd., Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys., to author (Aug. 20, 2012) (on file with author). 
 212. Id.  
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FIGURE 4: FEDERAL RESERVE MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS 
APPEALS PER YEAR (2001–2012) 
 
Between 2001 and 2012, the Federal Reserve received 25 appeals of 
MSDs. As with the OCC, there was an increase in the number of appeals 
corresponding with the 2008 financial crisis.
213
 
The vast majority of appeals were resolved at the initial review panel 
stage. Of the 25 appeals, only 6 pursued an additional appeal to the 
regional Reserve Bank President, and only 4 of those filed an appeal with 
the Federal Reserve Board Governor tasked with resolving appeals. The 
Federal Reserve did not indicate which regional Reserve Bank handled 
each appeal. 
Little is known about the entities bringing these appeals. In one 
instance, the reason for the appeal and the outcome suggest the appellant 
was a bank holding company,
214
 but in all other instances there is no 
description of the appealing institution. 
 
 
 213. It is also possible that information on appeals, particularly from the earlier years is 
incomplete. 
 214. The Federal Reserve listed the reason for the appeal as “[c]omposite/component BHC rating 
based on OCC subsidiary bank composite/component ratings and violations of law.” Letter from 
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As with the OCC, Federal Reserve appeals most frequently involved 
CAMELS composite or component ratings. Figure 5 details issues raised 
by at least 2 appeals. 
FIGURE 5: FEDERAL RESERVE MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS 
APPEALED (2001–2012) 
Reason for Appeal Number 
CAMELS Composite or Component Ratings 16 
Loan or Asset Classifications 7 
Capital Calculations 2 
Limitation or Restriction of Dividend Payments 2 
Issues Related to a Formal or Informal Enforcement Actions 2 
 
Of the 16 appeals involving CAMELS composite or component 
ratings, 12 specify “[c]omposite/component ratings” as the reason for the 
appeal.
215
 Two appeals involved the management component rating. One 
appeal involved the asset quality component rating. And 1 appeal involved 
a composite rating. The Federal Reserve did not provide any data about 
the actual rating (1-5) that the appealing entity received. 
The Federal Reserve’s appeals process rarely overturns MSDs. As 
shown in Figure 5, the process upheld the examiner determination 68% 
(17/25) of the time. Only 2 appeals (8%) reversed the examiner 
determination. Three appeals (12%) ultimatedly resulted in mixed 
decisions. Two appeals (8%) were withdrawn before any level of the 
appeals had reached a decision. Finally, in 1 appeal the review panel 
determined that the matter appealed was not a material supervisory 
determination.
216
  
 
 
Margaret McCloskey Shanks, Assoc. Sec’y of the Bd., Bd. of Governors of the Fed.l Reserve Sys., to 
author (Aug. 20, 2012) (on file with author).  
 215. Id. 
 216. This appeal is show in the “Other” category in Figure 5.  
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Other (1)
Reversed (2)
Withdrawn (2)
Mixed (3)
Upheld (17)
FIGURE 6: OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL RESERVE MATERIAL SUPERVISORY 
DETERMINATION APPEALS (2001–2012) 
 
Appeals were most successful at the review panel level. The review 
panel upheld 18 cases, reversed 2 cases, and issued mixed decisions in 2 
cases. Appeals escalated to the regional Reserve Bank President were 
never successful; all 6 president-level decisions upheld the examination 
determinations. Of the 4 appeals that were ultimately brought to a Federal 
Reserve Board Governor, 2 upheld the MSD, 1 was withdrawn before the 
Governor issued an opinion,
217
 and 1 resulted in a mixed decision. Because 
the Federal Reserve did not provide any underlying information about any 
of the appeals, it is impossible to assess whether the Federal Reserve has 
been consistent in its decision-making.  
 
 
 217. Because both the review committee and the President upheld this examiner decision, I 
categorized it as an appeal that upheld the examiner decision for the purpose of Figure 5. Only appeals 
that were withdrawn before any appeals process decision were included in the “Withdrawn” category 
for Figure 5.  
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C. FDIC 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures bank deposits.
218
 
Although the FDIC provides insurance for banks regulated by the OCC 
and Federal Reserve, the FDIC does not serve as the primary regulator for 
those banks.
219
 The FDIC is the primary federal regulator only for state-
chartered banks and thrifts that are not members of the Federal Reserve 
System.
220
 Because non-member state banks are also regulated by state 
authorities, the FDIC “and state regulators coordinate their supervisory 
programs and, in many instances, alternate examinations or conduct joint 
examinations.”221 In 2012, the FDIC served as the primary federal 
regulator for 4466 banks.
222
 More than 90% of those banks have assets of 
less than $1 billion.
223
 The FDIC had 7476 full-time equivalent 
employees.
224
 
1. FDIC Appeals Process 
Before Congress mandated that federal regulators provide an 
independent intra-agency review process for MSDs, the FDIC had an 
informal policy of reviewing “examination findings and similar decisions 
during the examination process.”225 Under that policy, banks could address 
a written request for “supplementary review” to the Division of 
Supervision Director in Washington, D.C.
226
 The Director would then 
“make a good faith effort to evaluate and resolve the issues raised.”227 
 
 
 218. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1814–15 (2012). 
 219. See supra Parts II.A, II.B (describing the examination authority of the OCC and Federal 
Reserve); 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(3) (giving the FDIC examination authority over all insured banks); 
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 27, at 632 (describing the examination conventions 
employed by federal regulators).  
 220. FDIC OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 2. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Find Banks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of 
Dec. 31, 2012 and Federal Regulator as FDIC) (last visited Feb. 25, 2015); Statistics on Depository 
Institutions, FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
 223. See Find Banks, FDIC, https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (search with Information as of 
Dec. 31, 2012, Size or Preformance as Total Assets ($) Equal or Less than $1,000,000,000, and 
Federal Regulator as FDIC) (listing 4152 state-chartered non-member banks with less than $1 billion 
in assets). 
 224. FDIC, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 133 (2013). 
 225. FDIC, Fin. Inst. Letter 11-92, Procedures for Requesting Review of Supervisory Decisions 
(Feb. 7, 1992), available at 1992 WL 714970. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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In response to the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 1994, the FDIC Board of Directors adopted new, 
more formal guidelines.
228
 The FDIC has amended these guidelines on 
four occasions, adjusting the scope of appealable matters, the composition 
of the appellate review committee, and the process for handling appeals.
229
  
As currently written, the FDIC guidelines encourage, but do not 
require, banks to make “a good-faith effort to resolve any dispute 
concerning a material supervisory determination with the on-site examiner 
and/or the appropriate Regional Office.”230 If the bank is still unhappy 
with an MSD, the bank may request that the Division or Office Director 
overseeing the examination conduct a formal review.
231
 The request for 
review must include a description of the issues with citations to relevant 
legal authority.
232
 The request for review must also indicate that the bank’s 
board of directors has authorized the review.
233
  
 
 
 228. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appellate Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,923 (Mar. 28, 1995). 
 229. See FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,479, 41,480 (July 9, 2004) 
(reducing the Supervisory Appellate Review Committee from five to three members and adjusting the 
process for triggering review by that Committee); FDIC, Guidelines for Appeals of Material 
Supervisory Determinations, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,822 (Sept. 23, 2008) (“eliminat[ing] the ability of an 
FDIC-supervised institution to file an appeal with the [Supervisory Review Committee] with respect to 
determinations or the facts and circumstances underlying a recommended or pending formal 
enforcement-related action or decision”); FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,358, 
20,359 (Apr. 19, 2010) (extending various deadlines for FDIC decisions on appeals); FDIC, Intra-
Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,056 (Mar. 23, 2012) (making changes to reflect 
organizational adjustments necessitated in part by the elimination of the Office of Thrift Supervision).  
The 2004 process changes suggest that the FDIC also amended the policy in 1999. See FDIC, Intra-
Agency Appeal Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,479, 41,480 (July 9, 2004) (“The 1995 SARC guidelines 
were amended in 1999 . . . to provide formally that the Directors of DOS and DCA (now the DSC 
Director) would not vote on cases brought before the SARC involving their respective (now 
consolidated) divisions . . . .”). However, when I made a FOIA request for documents related to a 1999 
change, the FDIC responded that it had no responsive documents, explaining that “the FDIC did not 
publish a 1999 edition of the Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations.” Letter 
from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA Specialist, FOIA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author (July 9, 2013) (on 
file with author). 
 230. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,057. 
 231. Id. (specifying that appeals should be made to “either the Director, [Division of Depositor 
and Consumer Protection], Director, [Division of Risk Management Supervision], or Director, [Office 
of Complex Financial Institutions]”). The Division of Risk Management Supervision has responsibility 
for safety and soundness examinations as well as trust operations, information technology controls, 
and Bank Secrecy Act compliance. FDIC OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 3.The Division of Depositor 
and Consumer Protection conducts examinations to assess compliance with the Community 
Reinvestment Act and consumer protection laws. Id. The Office of Complex Financial Institutions is 
tasked with overseeing the supervisory, insurance, and resolution risks presented to the FDIC by large 
and complex financial institutions. Id. at 3–4. 
 232. See FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,057 (additionally requiring a 
description of “how resolution of the dispute would materially affect the institution, and whether a 
good-faith effort was made to resolve the dispute with the on-site examiner and the Regional Office”). 
 233. Id. 
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The FDIC’s guidelines do not specify how the Division or Office 
Director should go about deciding the appeal. To fill this void, in 2004 the 
Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection (now known as the 
Division of Depositor and Consumer Protection) adopted its own policy 
for handling its appeals.
234
 There the Director appoints a three person 
committee to prepare “a memorandum that summarizes the institution’s 
position, the Regional Office’s position, and if applicable, the State 
banking authority’s position, as well as the basis for the Panel’s 
recommendation regarding each material supervisory determination.”235 
After reviewing this information, the Director makes his or her own 
assessment.
236
 In any event, the Division or Office Director will issue a 
written decision within forty-five days of receipt of the request.
237
  
If the bank is still not satisfied, it may appeal to the FDIC’s 
Supervision Appeals Review Committee. The Committee consists of three 
voting members, including one FDIC inside board member and one deputy 
or special assistant to a board member.
238
 “The [FDIC’s] General Counsel 
is a non-voting member of the [Committee].”239 The current Supervision 
Appeals Review Committee consists of FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas E. 
Hoenig, Deputy to the Chairman Kymberly Copa, and Deputy to the 
Director Marianne Hatheway.
240
 FDIC Acting General Counsel Richard 
Osterman serves as a nonvoting member of the Committee.
241
  
The bank must provide the Committee with contact information for the 
bank, the Division or Office Director’s determination, and an explanation 
of “all of the reasons, legal and factual, why it disagrees with the Division 
or Office Director’s determination.”242 The bank is generally prohibited 
from raising arguments or providing evidence that was not considered by 
 
 
 234. Div. of Supervision & Consumer Prot., FDIC, Guidelines for Processing Requests for 
Review of Material Supervisory Determinations (2004), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/sarc/ 
dscguidelines.html, archived at https://perma.cc/CUP4-2RKG [hereinafter FDIC DSC Guidelines]. 
Although the name of the division has changed and the FDIC’s appeals guidelines have been updated 
since 2004, see supra note 229, it does not appear that the Division has updated its process guidelines.  
 235. FDIC DSC GUIDELINES, supra note 234. If the subject matter of the appeal was the “joint 
product” of the FDIC and a state regulator, the FDIC must notify the state regulator of the appeal and 
provide that regulator with an opportunity to comment on it. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 
Fed. Reg. at 17,058. 
 236. FDIC DSC GUIDELINES, supra note 234. 
 237. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,057. 
 238. Id. at 17,056. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA Specialist, FOIA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author 
(July 15, 2013) (on file with author). 
 241. Id. 
 242. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,058. 
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the Division or Office Director.
243
 The Committee will not consider 
changes in facts or circumstances that arose after the completion of the 
examination.
244
 The appealing bank is not entitled to “discovery or other 
such rights.”245 
The FDIC guidelines contain a list of appealable items that includes 
CAMELS ratings, determinations concerning the adequacy of loan loss 
reserves, and “[c]lassifications of loans and other assets in dispute the 
amount of which, individually or in the aggregate, exceeds 10 percent of 
an institution’s total capital.”246 The guidelines specify that banks may not 
appeal “[f]ormal enforcement-related actions and decisions, including 
determinations and the underlying facts and circumstances that form the 
basis of a recommended or pending formal enforcement action, and FDIC 
determinations regarding compliance with an existing formal enforcement 
action.”247  
At the FDIC, the appeals process itself is not a trial-like review of the 
MSD. An appealing bank may request that it be allowed to make an oral 
presentation,
248
 but the Committee need not grant the request. The 
guidelines specify that oral presentation should only be granted if it “is 
likely to be helpful or would otherwise be in the public interest.”249 
According to Sandra L. Thompson, Director of the FDIC’s Division of 
Risk Management Supervision, institutions’ requests for oral presentation 
are “normally granted.”250 If the Committee allows an oral presentation, 
the Committee can question the institution and require that FDIC staff 
participate in the proceeding.
251
 The Committee “review[s] the appeal for 
consistency with the policies, practices, and mission of the FDIC and the 
overall reasonableness of, and the support offered for, the positions 
 
 
 243. See id. (“Evidence not presented for review to the Division or Office Director may be 
submitted to the [Committee] only if authorized by the [Committee] Chairperson.”).  
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 17,057. Banks may also appeal IT ratings, CRA ratings, consumer compliance ratings, 
trust ratings, securities dealer examination ratings, findings of statutory or regulatory violations, Truth 
in Lending Act restitution, and “[a]ny other supervisory determination . . . that may affect the capital, 
earnings, operating flexibility, or capital category for prompt corrective action purposes of an 
institution, or otherwise affect the nature and level of supervisory oversight accorded an institution.” 
Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 17,058. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 145 (written testimony of Sandra L. Thompson, 
Director, FDIC Division of Risk Management Supervision). 
 251. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,058. 
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advanced.”252 The bank bears the “burden of proof as to all matters at issue 
in the appeal.”253 
Regardless of whether there is a hearing, the Committee must convene 
to discuss the appeal within ninety days of the time the bank’s request for 
review was filed. Once the Committee has met, it has forty-five days to 
prepare a written decision and provide it to the appealing bank.
254
 The 
Committee then publishes the decision online, redacting it to omit 
confidential information about the bank or the bank’s customers.255 “In 
cases in which redaction is deemed insufficient to prevent improper 
disclosure, published decisions [are] presented in summary form.”256 
The FDIC’s guidelines prohibit examiners from retaliating against 
banks that use the appeals process. Retaliation “constitutes unprofessional 
conduct and will subject the examiner or other personnel to appropriate 
disciplinary or remedial action.”257 The process for handling allegations of 
retaliation is less clear. Banks are first “encouraged to contact the Regional 
Director,” but later the guidelines provide that institutions may file 
complaints of retaliation with the FDIC Ombudsman.
258
 If a bank 
complains of retaliation to the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman is instructed 
to “work with the appropriate Division or Office Director to resolve the 
allegation of retaliation.”259 
2. FDIC Appeals 
At the FDIC appeals must first be addressed to a Division Director.
260
 
The Director’s decision can then be appealed to the Supervision Appeals 
Review Committee.
261
 The FDIC does not publicly release Director-stage 
decisions. I requested those decisions through FOIA. The FDIC eventually 
 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See id. (noting that the appeals decisions can be cited as precedent). For a listing of these 
appeals, see Supervision Appeals Review Committee—Decisions, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/ 
regulations/laws/sarc/sarcappeals.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZNA5-PUEV (last updated Apr. 
16, 2014). 
 256. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,058. See, e.g., Material Supervisory 
Determination Decision of May 2, 2008, SARC-2007-04 (FDIC May 2, 2008), available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/sarc/sarcappeals/sarc200704.html, archived at https://perma.cc/ 
NP6C-9KS6. 
 257. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. at 17,059. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text. 
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provided a summary table listing the type of determination, the date the 
Director appeal was received, the action taken by the Director, the date of 
any appeal to the Committee, and the Committee’s decision.262 
It appears that some of the FOIA gathered data is incomplete—
particularly for appeals filed before 2005. The FOIA data list only 6 pre-
2005 Committee appeals. In contrast, the FDIC’s webpage contains 46 
pre-2005 Committee decisions.
263
 Because each appeal had to first be 
addressed to the appropriate Director, some Director appeals are missing 
from the FOIA data.
264
  
The FOIA-provided Director-level data from 2005 onward seem more 
complete.
265
 The FOIA data identifies 56 appeals filed between 2005 and 
2012. Figure 7 shows the number of director-level appeals by year during 
this time period. Of those, 25 generated appeals to the Committee.  
 
 
 262. Initially, the FDIC denied my request asserting the information was protected bank 
examination material under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8). Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA Specialist, 
FOIA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author (June 18, 2013) (on file with author). I appealed the denial 
to the FDIC’s General Counsel. Letter from author to Richard J. Osterman, Jr., Acting Gen. Counsel, 
FDIC (June 19, 2013) (on file with author). The FDIC then agreed to provide the summary 
information. Letter from Barbara Sarshik, Senior Counsel, FDIC, to author (July 30, 2013) (on file 
with author). The initial table provided by the FDIC omitted Committee information for some appeals. 
Id. A further FOIA request yielded the missing information. Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA 
Specialist, FOIA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author (Oct. 10, 2013) (on file with author). 
 263. Appeals to the Supervision Appeals Review Committee are summarized in Figure 8. 
 264. Record making and keeping during the pre-2005 time period may have been lacking. Cf. 
FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,479, 41,481 (July 9, 2004) (noting a financial 
institution’s complaint that it had never been “informed of [the Director’s] denial of its request for 
review or that the request has been passed to the SARC”). 
 265. In three instances, I still could not reconcile the FOIA data with the FDIC’s Supervision 
Appeals Review Committee decisions webpage. One webpage Committee decision did not appear on 
the FOIA list. Material Suprevisory Determination Decision of Sept. 7, 2010, SARC-2010-04 (FDIC 
Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/sarc/sarcappeals/sarc201004.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ZNA5-PUEV (appeal of rate restrictions under 12 C.F.R. § 337.6). Two 
Committee appeals on the FOIA list did not appear as decisions on the FDIC’s webpage. One was a 
March 24, 2005 appeal of a “[c]omposite rating; capital, management, earning, and liquidity 
component ratings” that was reportedly denied by the Committee. Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA 
Specialist, FOIA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author (Oct. 10, 2013) (on file with author). The other 
was a February 1, 2005 appeal of a “[c]onsumer compliance rating” that was reportedly denied by the 
Committee. Id. 
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FIGURE 7: FDIC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATION APPEALS 
FILED WITH A DIVISION DIRECTOR (2005–2012) 
 
In comparison, information about appeals decided by the Supervision 
Appeals Review Committee is more available and more complete. The 
FDIC has published online redacted or summary versions of every 
decision issued by its Supervision Appeals Review Committee since 
1995.
266
 I reviewed and classified each of these decisions.  
The Committee issued 63 decisions between 1995 and 2012. As shown 
in Figure 8, the Committee handled more appeals during its early years of 
operations. As with the OCC, the early number of appeals might be partly 
attributable to economic conditions and pent-up demand for an appeals 
process. At the FDIC, there is another likely reason: until 2004, any 
Division Director who decided an appeal against a bank was required to 
forward the appeal to the Supervision Appeals Review Committee for 
review.
267
 In 2004, the FDIC amended its process to allow the appealing 
 
 
 266. Supervision Appeals Review Committee—Decisions, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/ 
laws/sarc/sarcappeals.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZNA5-PUEV (last updated Apr. 16, 2014). 
 267. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appellate Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,923, 15,930 (Mar. 28, 1995). 
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bank to determine whether it wanted to pursue the additional appeal to the 
Committee.
268
 This change may have resulted in fewer appeals sent to the 
Committee after 2004. 
FIGURE 8: FDIC SUPERVISION APPEALS REVIEW COMMITTEE DECISIONS 
PER YEAR (1995–2012) 
 
As with the OCC and Federal Reserve, complaints about CAMELS 
composite or component ratings generated the most appeals (35). 
Community Reinvestment Act examination ratings also generated a 
significant number of appeals (19). Figure 9 summarizes issues raised by 
at least 2 appeals from 2005 through 2012. 
Of the appeals between 2005 and 2012 involving CAMELS ratings, the 
management rating was most commonly appealed (22 times), followed 
closely by the composite rating (19). Earnings (15), capital (14), and asset 
(12) ratings were also frequently appealed. Liquidity (6) and sensitivity to 
market risk (7) were appealed less frequently.  
 
 
 268. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,481. 
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FIGURE 9: FDIC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS APPEALED 
(2005–2012)269 
Reason for Appeal Number 
CAMELS Composite or Component Ratings 35 
Community Reinvestment Act Rating 19 
Loan or Asset Classifications 13 
Consumer Compliance Exam Rating or Conclusions 12 
Fair Housing Act / Equal Credit Opportunity Act Findings or Violations 7 
Capital Calculations or Classification and Resulting Restrictions 6 
Issues Related to a Formal or Informal Enforcement Actions 6 
Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses 3 
Accounting Issues 3 
Insider Lending / Regulation O 3 
Designation of the Bank as “Troubled” 2 
Determination that Bank Must Amend Its Call Report 2 
 
Data on the numerical ratings appealed are only available for those 
appeals handled by the Supervision Appeals Review Committee.
270
 During 
the 2005 to 2012 time period, appeals of a three-rating were most likely to 
be heard by the Committee: 47 three-ratings were appealed. In 
comparison, 23 two-ratings were appealed, 16 four-ratings were appealed, 
and 5 five-ratings were appealed. When compared with OCC-regulated 
banks, FDIC-regulated banks appear more likely to appeal a two-rating.  
 
 
 269. Data for this figure were compiled from the FOIA-provided summary of Director-level 
appeals. Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA Specialist, FOIA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author 
(Oct. 10, 2013) (on file with author). As such, it contains the issues as characterized by the FDIC. I 
attempted to reconcile the FOIA information with the Supervision Appeals Review Committee 
Decisions. See Supervision Appeals Review Committee—Decisions, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/ 
regulations/laws/sarc/sarcappeals.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZNA5-PUEV (last updated Apr. 
16, 2014). In cases where the Director decision was appealed to the Committee, the FDIC’s 
description of the issued appealed was generally accurate. 
 270. I collected the data reporte in this paragraph from the FDIC web page. See Supervision 
Appeals Review Committee—Decisions, supra note 269. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1148 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1101 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10: OUTCOMES OF FDIC MATERIAL SUPERVISORY 
DETERMINATION APPEALS (2005–2012)271 
 
When banks appeal MSDs using the FDIC’s process, they rarely win. 
Between 2005 and 2012,
272
 only 2 decisions were entirely in favor of the 
 
 
 271. Data for this figure were compiled from both the data received through FOIA and the 
publicly available appeals decisions. See Letter from Jim Braun, Senior FOIA Specialist, 
FOIA/Privacy Act Group, FDIC, to author (Oct. 10, 2013) (on file with author); Supervision Appeals 
Review Committee—Decisions, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/sarc/sarcappeals.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ZNA5-PUEV (last updated Apr. 16, 2014). Figure 10 shows the ultimate 
outcome whether reached at the Director level or at the Supervision Appeals Review Committee 
Level. For this reason, it contains data on 2 more appeals than the data in Figures 8 and 9. See supra 
note 265 (describing minor data inconsistencies). For those curious about just those appeals before the 
Supervision Appeals Review Committee (1995–2012): 58 upheld the examiner determination, 4 
reversed the examiner determination, and 1 was a mixed decision. 
 272. It is unclear whether this same pattern holds for pre-2005 appeals. Of the Supervision 
Appeals Review Committee decisions issued before 2005, 39 upheld the examiner determination, 4 
reversed the examiner determination, and 4 were mixed decisions. On the other hand, the likely 
incomplete FOIA list of appeals, see supra note 264 and accompanying text, show 5 appeals upholding 
the examiner, 8 reversing the examiner, 6 mixed decisions, and 2 withdrawn appeals. 
Reversed (2)
Mixed (3)
Withdrawn (7)
Other (11)Upheld (35)
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bank
273
 and 3 were decided partially in favor of the bank.
274
 This means 
that the appealing bank had a favorable result in less than 10% of appeals 
(5/58). In contrast, the process fully upheld the examiner 60% (35/58) of 
the time. Of the 11 appeals falling in the “other” category, the Director or 
Committee determined that 7 were ineligible for review and returned them 
without a written decision.
275
 
D. NCUA 
The National Credit Union Administration supervises federally-
chartered credit unions
276
 as well as federally insured state-chartered credit 
unions.
277
 Credit unions are distinct from the financial institutions 
previously discussed because they are owned by their “members” (rather 
than investors),
278
 have limited authority to engage in commercial 
lending,
279
 and pay fewer taxes.
280
 Credit unions are, on average, smaller 
than banks.
281
 Notwithstanding these differences, the NCUA evaluates 
credit unions using the CAMEL rating system
282
 and, like the other federal 
regulators, must provide an “independent intra-agency appellate process 
. . . to review material supervisory determinations.”283 As of the end of 
2012, the NCUA supervised 4272 federal credit unions and 2547 federally 
 
 
 273. In one of those cases, the regional office reconsidered and upgraded the appealed 
management rating before the Director decided the appeal. The other bank win was issued at the 
Director-level. 
 274. One mixed decision was issued at the Director-level. The other 2 were issued by the 
Supervision Appeals Review Committee. 
 275. The outcomes of 3 appeals were categorized as “other” because the bank was closed or its 
deposit insurance was terminated. The final “other” appeal was “Returned/PCA notice rescinded.” 
 276. 12 U.S.C. § 1756 (2012). 
 277. Id. §§ 1782, 1784. Credit union deposits can be insured by the National Credit Union Share 
Insurance Fund, an insurance fund operated by the federal government that is similar to the FDIC’s 
insurance fund for banks. Id. § 1783. Both federally-chartered and state-chartered credit unions are 
eligible for this federal insurance, and most elect its coverage. See id. § 1781(a); The State of the 
Credit Union Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 
15 (2010) (written statement of Deborah Matz, Chairman, NCUA). 
 278. 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (2012) (describing membership in federal credit unions); id. § 1752(6) 
(describing “State-chartered credit union” as “a credit union organized and operated according to the 
laws of any State, the District of Columbia, the several territories and possessions of the United States, 
the Panama Canal Zone, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which laws provide for the 
organization of credit unions similar in principle and objectives to Federal credit unions”). 
 279. Id. § 1757(a). 
 280. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(14)(A) (2012) (providing that credit unions, as non-profit, mutual 
organizations, are exempt from federal income tax). 
 281. TIMOTHY W. KOCH & S. SCOTT MACDONALD, BANK MANAGEMENT 40–41 (7th ed. 2010). 
 282. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
 283. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(a) (2012). 
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insured state-chartered credit unions.
284
 It has 1191 full-time equivalent 
employees.
285
  
1. NCUA Appeals Process 
The NCUA adopted its process for reviewing MSDs in 1995 following 
the Congressional mandate.
286
 Although the NCUA has made minor 
changes to the scope of appealable matters, the structure of its appeals 
process has remained largely unchanged.
287
  
Like other regulators, the NCUA prefers to address credit unions’ 
complaints informally.
288
 However, when such avenues prove ineffective, 
the NCUA’s MSD appeals process is open to both federally-chartered 
credit unions and federally insured state-chartered credit unions.
289
 State-
chartered credit unions can only appeal those determinations that were 
made by an NCUA examiner.
290
 If a state examiner made the MSD at 
issue, the NCUA refers the appeal to the state for appropriate action.
291
 
According to an NCUA policy statement, the first step in the appeals 
process is to “contact the regional office regarding the examiner’s decision 
within 30 days of the examiner’s final determination.”292 The policy 
 
 
 284. NCUA, FINANCIAL TRENDS IN FEDERALLY INSURED CREDIT UNIONS: DECEMBER 31, 2012, 
available at http://www.ncua.gov/Legal/Documents/Reports/FT20121231.pdf, archived at http://perma. 
cc/M3S5-ALWQ. 
 285. NCUA, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2013). 
 286. NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,795 (Mar. 20, 
1995) (also known as NCUA Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement 95-1). 
 287. In 2001, the NCUA adopted a program known as RegFlex that allowed strong credit unions 
exemptions from some regulatory requirements. The NCUA subsequently amended the appeals 
process to allow credit unions to appeal the NCUA’s determination as to whether the credit union 
qualified for RegFlex. See NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 67 Fed. Reg. 
19,778 (Apr. 23, 2002) (also known as NCUA Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement 02-1); NCUA, 
Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,674 (Jan. 20, 2011); NCUA, 
Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,871 (Apr. 29, 2011) (combining 
two previous sets of guidelines). Later, the NCUA abandoned the RegFlex program and accordingly 
adjusted the list of appealable issues. NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 77 
Fed. Reg. 32,004 (May 31, 2012). The current guidelines, as amended, are available in an NCUA 
Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement. NCUA, IRPS 11-1(AS AMENDED BY I RPS 12-1), 
SUPERVISORY REVIEW COMMITTEE (2012), available at http://www.ncua.gov/Legal/Documents/ 
IRPS/IRPS2011-1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BMZ8-MEAX [hereinafter NCUA IRPS 11-1].  
 288. See id. at 1. 
 289. Id.  
 290. Id. at 2. As explained earlier, the NCUA only conducts on-site examinations of those state-
chartered credit unions that pose greater risk to the share insurance fund. See supra note 19. 
 291. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 2. This situation would most likely arise when the state 
credit union regulator conducted the examination that led to the appeal. See Lee Interview, supra note 
13. 
 292. See NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 1.Corporate credit unions “must contact the Office 
of Corporate Credit Unions,” the subdivision of the NCUA that oversees their examination and 
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statement is somewhat unclear about whether this mandatory step is 
simply a notification to the office that oversees the examiner or whether 
the notification is intended to be treated as an appeal to the examiner’s 
supervisor. The policy statement provides that “the dispute will be handed 
[sic] by the Region and become appealable to the [Supervisory Review] 
Committee either 30 days after a regional determination or 60 days after 
the regional office has been contacted if it has not made a 
determination.”293 According to Joy K. Lee, the current chair of the 
Supervisory Review Committee, the regional directors routinely 
investigate credit union appeals and respond in writing during the 30-day 
period.
294
 
In any event, if the credit union’s “contact” with the regional office 
does not resolve the dispute, the next step in the appeals process is to 
submit an appeal in writing to the NCUA’s Supervisory Review 
Committee.
295
 The appeal must be authorized by the board of directors of 
the credit union and “must include the name of the appellant credit union, 
the determination or denial being appealed and the reasons for the 
appeal.”296 The policy statement encourages credit unions “to submit all 
information and supporting documentation relevant to the matter in 
dispute.”297 In practice, the material submitted varies widely—from a four-
page letter to several binders of material.
298
 The Committee may then 
“request additional information” from the credit union or the regional 
office.
299
 The Committee often sends a letter detailing these additional 
required materials, but it is also common for the chair of the Committee to 
have a telephone discussion with the credit union to provide more 
guidance on potentially helpful documentation.
300
 The Committee also 
reviews the material that was submitted to the Regional Director and the 
Regional Director’s decision.301  
 
 
enforcement. Id. at 2. Current chair of the NCUA’s Supervisory Review Committee, Joy K. Lee, notes 
that before raising the issue with the regional director, a credit union should have already raised the 
issue with the examiner, the supervisory examiner, and the associate regional director. Lee Interview, 
supra note 13. 
 293. See NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 2.  
 294. Lee Interview, supra note 13. 
 295. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 2. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Lee Interview, supra note 13. 
 299. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 2. 
 300. Lee Interview, supra note 13. 
 301. Id. 
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The NCUA’s Supervisory Review Committee is made up of three 
“members of the NCUA’s senior staff as appointed by the NCUA 
Chairman.”302 No members of the Committee can directly oversee the 
examination function.
303
 All Committee members serve a one-year term, 
but can be reappointed for additional terms.
304
 Until recently, the NCUA 
treated the makeup of the Committee as a closely guarded secret.
305
 
However, facing calls for greater transparency in the wake of the financial 
crisis, the NCUA now publishes the names of Committee members on its 
website.
306
 The Committee currently consists of a program officer, the 
Secretary to the NCUA Board, and the Special Assistant to the Executive 
Director.
307
 A FOIA request for the names and titles of past members of 
the Committee reveals that it is common for the Committee to contain an 
attorney
308
 as well as former credit union examiners. Most Committee 
members serve only one or two years.
309
 
Perhaps the most novel part of the NCUA appeals process is the scope 
of appealable determinations. Under NCUA’s policy statement, appealable 
MSDs include: “(1) composite CAMEL ratings of 3, 4, and 5 and all 
component ratings of those composite ratings; (2) adequacy of loan loss 
reserve provisions; and (3) loan classifications on loans that are significant 
as determined by the appealing credit union.”310 On the one hand, the 
NCUA’s scope of appealable matters is narrow. Under the policy 
 
 
 302. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 1. 
 303. Id. (stating that no members of the Committee “shall be currently serving as a Regional 
Director, Associate Regional Director, Executive Director, Director of the Office of Small Credit 
Union Initiatives, or Senior Policy Advisor of Chief of Staff to a Board Member”). 
 304. See id. 
 305. See Sara Snell Cooke, Editor’s Column, The Absence of Light Causes Darkness, CREDIT 
UNION TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, at 4 (stating that when the Credit Union Times reported the name of the 
Chairman of the Supervisory Review Committee, the NCUA asked the Credit Union Times to remove 
the information from the Internet). 
 306. NCUA, Guidelines for the Supervisory Review Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,871, 23,872 
(Apr. 29, 2011).  
 307. Supervisory Review Committee, NCUA, http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/CUs/Pages/ 
SRC.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (listing Joy K. Lee, Special Assistant to the Executive Director, 
Gerard Poliquin, Secretary of the Board, and Judy Graham, Program Officer, as members of the 
Committee). 
 308. Attorneys who have served on the Committee include: John Ianno (Trial Attorney, 1995), 
Sheila Albin (Assoc. Gen. Counsel, 1996–97), Hattie M. Ulan (Special Counsel to the Gen. Counsel, 
1998–2000), Chrisanthy Loizos (EEO Counselor, 2003–05), Regina Metz (Staff Attorney, 2006–07), 
Linda Dent (Staff Attorney, 2008), Ross Kendall (Trial Attorney, 2009–10, 2012–2013), and Gerard 
Poliquin (Sr. Trial Attorney, 2011). Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Mar. 
22, 2013) (on file with author) (responding to a FOIA request for members and titles for the NCUA 
Supervisory Review Committee). None of the attorneys has served as chair of the Committee. Id. 
 309. See id.  
 310. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 1. 
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statement, credit unions can only appeal a component CAMEL rating if 
the overall composite CAMEL rating is a 3, 4, or 5.
311
 So, for example, a 
credit union that received a 3 management rating could not appeal that 
rating if the credit union received a composite rating of 1 or 2.
312
 On the 
other hand, in some respects the scope of appealable matters is quite 
broad. The Supervisory Review Committee can review loan classifications 
if the appealing credit union considers the classification significant.
313
 
Moreover, a credit union’s right to appeal is not cut off if NCUA imposes 
formal or informal enforcement action on the credit union.
314
 However, in 
those circumstances, the credit union must comply with the enforcement 
action while the appeal is pending
315
 and a reversal of the MSD would not 
necessarily terminate the enforcement action.
316
 Nevertheless, an 
enforcement action does not preclude review of an MSD by the 
Committee. 
In deciding the appeal, the Committee has “free rein . . . to talk to 
anybody” that would provide useful information, including the original 
examiner or other experts within the NCUA.
317
 However, the Committee 
members have not, to date, visited an appealing credit union.
318
 The 
appealing credit union is “entitled to a personal appearance before the 
Committee.”319 The credit union can choose whether to allow directors or 
executives to present their case or whether to employ attorneys.
320
 In the 
last few years, the NCUA has made an effort to formalize this 
“appearance,” making it a court-like process.321 A court reporter 
transcribes the proceedings and the Committee goes “off the record and on 
 
 
 311. Id.  
 312. Lee Interview, supra note 13. 
 313. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 1 (emphasis added); Lee Interview, supra note 13 
(noting that appealing credit unions can “determine if they feel like it’s a material size loan or not”). 
 314.  According to Supervisory Review Committee Chair Lee, there is “really no connection” 
between enforcement actions and the right to appeal an MSD. Lee Interview, supra note 13. “Anybody 
can [appeal], it doesn’t matter if you have a regional director letter, a preliminary warning letter, a 
letter of understanding and agreement, or cease-and-desist.” Id. 
 315. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 2. 
 316. According to Supervisory Review Committee Chair Lee, if the Committee during the appeals 
process found a significant error, the NCUA would have to revisit the need for the enforcement action, 
but termination of the enforcement action would not be “automatic.” Lee Interview, supra note 13 
(noting that this circumstance has not yet arisen at the NCUA).  
 317. Id. (describing circumstances where the Committee Chair spoke with an examiner, a 
supervisory examiner, a chief accountant, and a record keeping specialist). 
 318. Id.  
 319. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 2 (allowing the “personal appearance” to be held 
“through teleconference”). 
 320. See Lee Interview, supra note 13. 
 321. See id. 
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the record.”322 The Committee also questions the credit union.323 After the 
appearance, the Committee members meet to discuss the appeal and reach 
a decision.
324
  
The NCUA policy statement does not specify what standard of review 
the Committee should use in evaluating appeals. Joy K. Lee, the current 
Chairman of the NCUA Supervisory Review Committee, explains the 
standard of review as follows: 
I view myself as a completely independent party. And so I look at it 
like it’s a brand new thing. I just don’t totally go with whatever the 
examiner said and I just don’t, you know, completely just say, 
“Well, this is the examiner’s deal, the regional director’s 
determination, so I’m not going to open my eyes to the credit 
union.” I don’t. I really and truly look at this as an independent 
authority and I look at both sides of the coin, and try to understand, 
you know, the reasons why for both parties.
325
 
Ms. Lee also noted that she has broad investigative power to talk with 
those at the credit union and within the NCUA.
326
  
Once the Committee has reached a conclusion, it drafts and edits a 
written decision.
327
 Under normal circumstances, the Committee will reach 
a decision on the appeal within 30 days of the time the credit union filed 
the appeal.
328
 The Committee sends the written decision to the credit union 
as well as to the Regional Director that oversees the credit union.
329
 The 
decisions are not routinely circulated further within the NCUA
330
 or 
released (even in redacted or summary form) to the general public.
331
  
 
 
 322. See id. 
 323. Id. (stating that the Committee generally asks “very limited questions”). 
 324. Id. (explaining that the meeting might be immediately after the appearance or on a later date, 
depending on the length of the appearance). 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 2 (noting that the 30-day timeframe is “subject to 
adjustment by the Committee, whether on its own or upon request of the appellant or the Region or 
other office involved”). 
 329. Lee Interview, supra note 13. 
 330. In cases where the appeal receives media attention, the decision is circulated to the NCUA’s 
public and congressional affairs staff as well as the NCUA Chairman. Id. 
 331. The NCUA released redacted decisions in response to my FOIA request. Letter from Regina 
Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 19, 2012). This is the only time decisions have been 
released. See Lee Interview, supra note 13 (noting that redacted opinions had been released in 
response to a single FOIA request). 
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If the appealing credit union is unhappy with the Supervisory Review 
Committee’s decision, it can appeal to the NCUA Board.332 The NCUA’s 
policy statement on appeals does not further discuss the procedures the 
Board uses for these appeals.
333
 
At the NCUA, the Inspector General is tasked with resolving 
allegations of suspected retaliation.
334
 According to the policy statement, 
“[a]ny retaliation by NCUA staff against a credit union making any type 
of appeal will subject the employee to appropriate disciplinary or remedial 
action by the appropriate supervisor.”335 The NCUA recently added 
language about their non-retaliation policy to the cover sheet that 
accompanies all examination reports.
336
  
2. NCUA Appeals 
The NCUA does not publicly release appeals decisions in summary or 
redacted form. Moreover, for much of its history, the Supervisory Review 
Committee’s recordkeeping was lacking. A 2012 report by the NCUA’s 
Inspector General “determined the [Supervisory Review Committee] 
[kept] all of its records in hard-copy format in a cardboard box. During a 
change in [Committee] chairpersons in late 2011, the outgoing chairperson 
passed the cardboard box of files to the newly appointed chairperson.”337 
Nevertheless, in response to my FOIA requests, the NCUA provided 
redacted Supervisory Review Committee decisions.
338
 I reviewed and 
categorized each of these decisions. The NCUA also provided a 
spreadsheet summarizing credit unions’ written “contacts”339 with NCUA 
 
 
 332. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 3 (allowing credit unions thirty days to appeal to the 
Board). 
 333.  Id.  
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Mary Dunn, NCUA Responding to CU Exam Issues, CREDIT UNION MAG., June 2012, at 58 
(noting that a credit union trade group had received a letter from the NCUA stating that “as a result of 
your input, we will add specific language on the exam report cover page to emphasize NCUA’s non-
retaliation policy”). 
 337. NCUA OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 25. 
 338. See Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 19, 2012) (on file with 
author); Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (July 19, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
 339. As previously explained, the NCUA describes the first stage of its review process as “contact 
with the regional office” rather than as an appeal. See supra note 292–294 and accompanying text. 
Consequently, I have used the “contact” language throughout this section when describing appeals to 
Regional Offices. 
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Regional Offices concerning MSDs.
340
 The spreadsheet shows the year 
each credit union contacted the Regional Office, whether the credit union 
was a federal or state-chartered credit union, the general subject matter of 
the contact, the Region’s actions, and whether an appeal was filed with the 
Supervisory Review Committee.
341
 Data in the spreadsheet begin in 
2002.
342
 This section reports information collected from these FOIA 
requests.
343
 Because of the small number of Supervisory Review 
Committee decision (6 between 1995 and 2012), the bulk of this section 
reports NCUA contacts as characterized by the NCUA. 
The FOIA information provided shows 140 total Regional Office 
contacts. As illustrated in Figure 11, the NCUA-provided data show an 
upward trend in the number of contacts per year. There are several 
possible explanations. First, information about early contacts may be 
incomplete. Although my FOIA request sought information on regional 
office contacts beginning on January 1, 1995, the information provided 
began in 2002. Information about earlier contacts may not have been kept, 
or, if it was kept, was subsequently destroyed.
344
 Second, the financial 
crisis beginning in 2008 could have led to more appeals.
345
 Third, the 
NCUA has recently undertaken an effort to publicize its process for 
appealing MSDs.
346
 This may have increased credit unions’ utilization of 
the appeals process.  
 
 
 340. Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 16, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
 341. Id.  
 342. Id.  
 343. See Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 19, 2012) (on file with 
author); Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (July 19, 2013) (on file with 
author); Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 16, 2013) (on file with 
author).  
 344. Additionally, 2 Supervisory Review Committee decisions (years 2008 and 2012) do not seem 
to appear on the NCUA’s list of regional office contacts. Perhaps these credit unions simply did not 
approach the regional office, see supra notes 292–94 and accompanying text, or perhaps this 
information was missing from the information provided. 
 345. Lee Interview, supra note 13 (noting the financial crisis had increased appeals and that credit 
unions tended to “lag behind the banks in terms of financial crisis”). 
 346. See id.; Ulan Interview, supra note 13. See also Letter from Debbie Matz, Chairman, NCUA, 
to Federally Insured Credit Unions (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/ 
Documents/LCU2013-01.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z3WJ-SH82 (NCUA Letter 13-CU-01) 
(noting that “information on all formal and informal appeal options available to credit unions is now 
included in the exam report cover letter”). 
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FIGURE 11: NCUA MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATION CONTACTS 
FILED WITH A REGIONAL OFFICE (2002–2012) 
 
Which credit unions initiated contacts? Of the 140 contacts, 126 (90%) 
were made by credit unions with a federal charter and only 14 (10%) were 
made by credit unions with a state charter. Although the disparity seems 
large, there are almost twice as many federal credit unions as there are 
state credit unions.
347
 In addition, the NCUA does not annually conduct 
examinations at each state-chartered credit union; it examines only those 
credit unions with the most risk.
348
 Finally, until recently, the NCUA did 
not release its examination ratings of state-chartered credit unions to the 
credit unions themselves.
349
 Each of these factors explains why more 
federal credit unions than state credit unions contact regional offices 
regarding MSDs.  
 
 
 347. See supra note 284. 
 348. See supra note 19. 
 349. Letter from Debbie Matz, Chairman, NCUA, to Federally Insured State Credit Unions (Aug. 
2011), available at http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/Pages/LCU2011-12.aspx (NCUA Letter 11-CU-
12). 
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FIGURE 12: NCUA MATERIAL SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS 
PROMPTING CONTACT WITH REGIONAL OFFICE (2002–2012)350 
Reason for Appeal Number 
CAMEL Composite or Component Ratings 65 
Document of Resolution 47 
Examiner Findings / Examination Findings 20 
Report of Examination / Report Wording 14 
Examiner Conduct (including Examiner Communication) 11 
Risk Rating 4 
Insurance Review Examination Rating 3 
 
Figure 12 summarizes issues raised by at least 2 Regional Office 
contacts. As with the OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC, disagreement over 
CAMEL composite or component ratings was the most common reason 
that credit unions used the MSD appeals process. Additionally, 47 appeals 
involved a document of resolution, an enforcement tool used by examiners 
encouraging the credit union to agree with recommended remedial 
actions.
351
 Because the NCUA provided this information in spreadsheet 
form, little else is know about the substance of these appeals.
352
  
Five appeals handled by the Supervisory Review Committee concerned 
CAMEL composite or component ratings.
353
 One appeal to the 
Supervisory Review Committee alleged that “agency field staff require[d] 
[the credit union] to submit additional monthly reporting information in 
retaliation for a complaint lodged by the credit union against a supervisory 
examiner.”354 It is possible that the Committee appeals contained 
 
 
 350. Data for this figure were compiled from NCUA-provided summaries of regional office 
contacts. As such, it contains the issues as characterized by the NCUA. 
 351. NCUA, EXAMINER’S GUIDE 20-4 (2004), available at http://www.ncua.gov/Legal/ 
GuidesEtc/ExaminerGuide/chapter20.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2H4W-97EG (describing 
documents of resolution). 
 352. See Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 16, 2013) (on file with 
author).  
 353. See Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (Sept. 19, 2012) (on file with 
author); Letter from Regina Metz, Staff Attorney, NCUA, to author (July 19, 2013) (on file with 
author); In most cases, the NCUA redacted the numerical ratings (1-5) that the credit union received 
from the appeals decision before releasing the Supervisory Review Committee decision through FOIA. 
 354. On that issue, the Committee concluded that “the Region’s material supervisory 
determination was based upon objective criteria.” Thus, the complaint of retaliation was “not within 
the purview of the [Committee].” Id. 
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additional issues, but the decisions have been redacted so heavily it is 
impossible to tell.
355
 
FIGURE 13: OUTCOMES OF NCUA MATERIAL SUPERVISORY 
DETERMINATION APPEALS PROCESS (2002–2012)356 
  
 
 
 355. For example, the press widely reported that Commodore Perry Federal Credit Union brought 
an appeal alleging that “its examiner retaliated by reporting inaccurate exam findings because 
management complained to the NCUA that he sexually harassed and bullied [Credit Union] 
employees.” See, e.g., Heather Anderson, Ohio CU’s Appeal, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Oct. 31, 2012, at 
1, 20. The redacted Committee decisions from this time period do not discuss any retaliation issues. Of 
course, it is also possible that the press reports simply do not match the information contained in the 
credit union’s appeal.  
 356. This graph shows outcomes of all uses of the appeals process whether the appeal concluded 
at the Regional Office contact or the Supervisory Review Committee. The number of total appeals 
here is two more than the total regional office contacts because the FOIA data on Regional Office 
contacts seems to be missing two appeals that were handled by the Supervisory Review Committee. 
See supra note 344 (describing my reconciliation of the data). It is possible that some negative 
outcomes of Regional Office office contacts were appealed the Supervisory Review Committee. If the 
Committee issued a decision after the close of 2013, the final outcome of the appeals process would 
not be captured in Figure 13. Thus, Figure 13 might understate the success rate for appeals. Complete 
Supervisory Review Committee data are not available for 2013. Preliminary information shows that 
the Committee issued at least 3 decisions in 2013. These decisions involved appeals of CAMEL 
composite and component ratings and resulted in decisions upholding the initial examiner decision. 
Thus, to the extent that Figure 13 might understate the rate of success, the discrepancy is likely slight.  
Other (17)
Amended (26)
Concurred (99)
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When credit unions use the NCUA’s MSD appeals process, they rarely 
succeed in overturning the initial examination determination. As illustrated 
in Figure 13, the overall success was 18% (26/142). Seventy percent 
(98/140) of Regional Office contacts upheld the examiner decision.
357
 Less 
than 20% (25/140) of Region Office contacts amended the examiner 
decision. In spite of the low rate of credit union success at the Regional 
Office contact level, there are few appeals filed with the NCUA’s 
Supervisory Review Committee. The Committee issued only 6 decisions 
between 1995 and 2012. Five of those Committee decisions upheld the 
examiner decisions. In the single successful Supervisory Review 
Committee appeal, a credit union challenged the Office of Small Credit 
Union Initiative’s decision to deny a $5,000 grant reimbursement. Only 1 
MSD appeal has been filed with the NCUA Board, and it was withdrawn 
before the Board issued a decision.
358
  
III. WEAKNESSES IN THE APPEALS PROCESSES 
Analysis of the MSD appeals processes shows significant weaknesses. 
This section will address three weaknesses in more detail: (1) the lack of 
consistency among regulators, (2) the small number of appeals, and (3) the 
lack of transparency regarding appeals. 
A. Variations Among Regulators 
First, there are significant differences among the MSD appeals 
processes used by each regulator. This is true even though regulators, at 
the urging of Congress, generally strive for consistency in the examination 
process.
359
 Any time four separate regulators implement a single statute, 
 
 
 357. Outcome data for regional office contacts were compiled from the FOIA-provided summary 
of regional office contacts. See supra note 339–340 and accompanying text (describing these data). 
“Amended” refers to those instances where the appeals process reversed the examiner decision in 
whole or in part. As such, it is the combination of the “reversed” and “mixed” data categories reported 
for OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC appeals. See supra Figures 3, 6, 10. The “Other” category 
consists of contacts that the NCUA described as “resolved” (1), “reevaluated” (1), “addressed” (11), 
“explained” (2), and “updated” (2). 
 358. See Heather Anderson, Commodore Stops Appeal, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Apr. 3, 2013, at 1, 
23 (noting that a credit union had filed, but then withdrawn a Board-level appeal); Lee Interview, 
supra note 13 (stating the Board had never decided an appeal). 
 359. Congress created the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council in 1979 to 
“prescribe uniform principles and standards for the Federal examination of financial institutions . . . 
and make recommendations to promote uniformity in the supervision of these financial institutions.” 
12 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012). Working together as part of the Examination Council, officials from each 
regulator developed the CAMELS system. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. To ensure 
that the CAMELS system is consistently implemented across each of the federal regulators, the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/5
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differences are likely to arise. While policies should be tailored to meet the 
unique structure of the agency and the nature of the regulated institutions, 
policies should not advantage or disadvantage financial institutions based 
solely on the institutions’ primary federal regulator. Regulatory decisions 
regarding the scope of appealable items and the standard of review used 
when evaluating an appeal have the potential to significantly alter the 
substantive rights of financial institutions. Such differences are 
inconsistent with Congressional and regulatory policies promoting 
uniformity. 
1. Scope of Appealable Matters 
Congress required that regulators provide a process for appealing 
“material supervisory determinations.” Regulators disagree as to what this 
means. This section focuses on area of divergence: (1) differences in the 
appealability of examination ratings and (2) differences in the 
appealability of MSDs related to enforcement actions. In both of these 
cases, differences in the scope of appealable matters mean that some 
financial institutions have greater access to an appeals process than others. 
a. CAMELS Ratings 
Congress defined MSD to include “examination ratings.”360 The OCC, 
Federal Reserve, and FDIC allow financial institutions to appeal any 
examination rating.
361
 The NCUA, however, only allows appeals of 
“composite CAMEL ratings of 3, 4, and 5 and all component ratings of 
those composite ratings.”362 That means a credit union with a composite 
CAMEL rating of 2 and a management rating of 3 or 4 cannot appeal 
either the composite rating or the management rating.
363
 Yet such appeals 
 
 
Examination Council “conduct[s] schools for examiners and assistant examiners.” 12 U.S.C. § 3305(d) 
(2012). 
 360. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(f)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 361. The OCC policy allows appeal of “[e]xamination ratings.” OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra 
note 10. The Federal Reserve policy defines “material supervisory determination” to include 
“examination or inspection composite ratings,” Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 16,470, 16,473 (Mar. 30, 1995), and the information provided shows appeals for CAMELS 
composite and component ratings. The FDIC policy allows appeals of CAMELS ratings, IT ratings, 
trust ratings, CRA ratings, and consumer compliance ratings. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 
Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,057 (Mar. 23, 2012).  
 362. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 3. 
 363. Lee Interview, supra note 13. 
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have been heard by both the OCC and FDIC.
364
 Credit unions, thus, have 
less access to an appeals process. 
b. Enforcement-Related Determinations 
The handling of MSDs related to enforcement actions is even more 
fractured. Congress specified that MSDs do not include regulators’ 
decisions to close financial institutions or take prompt corrective action, 
including the removal of officers and directors, from undercapitalized 
institutions.
365
 Congress added that the MSD appeals process does not 
“affect the authority of an appropriate Federal banking agency or the 
National Credit Union Administration Board to take enforcement or 
supervisory action.”366 While this seems to preclude using the MSD 
appeals processes to directly challenge prompt corrective action directives, 
it gives regulators leeway in dealing with determinations related to formal 
or informal enforcement actions. 
OCC-regulated banks can use the MSD appeals process to challenge 
findings that a bank has not complied with an enforcement action.
367
 In 
addition, an OCC-regulated bank can challenge CAMELS ratings and 
other MSDs while under an enforcement action,
368
 but cannot challenge 
“the underlying facts that form the basis of a recommended or pending 
formal enforcement action and the acts or practices that are the subject of a 
pending formal enforcement action.”369  
 
 
 364. See, e.g., Material Supervisory Determination of First Quarter 2006, OCC Q.J., Mar. 2006, 
at 37 (2006) (appeal of composite and component rating); FDIC, Appeal of Material Supervisory 
Determination: Guidelines & Decisions, SARC-2004-02 (FDIC Apr. 12, 2004) (appeal of CAMELS 
compenent ratings for asset quality and management), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/ 
laws/sarc/sarcappeals/sarc200402.html, archived at http://perma.cc/H4HA-3XCV (appeal of 
CAMELS component ratings for asset quality and management). Although the Federal Reserve’s 
guidelines are worded broadly enough to allow appeals from institutions with a 1 or 2 composite 
rating, the data gathered through FOIA are insufficient to confirm that the Federal Reserve has actually 
considered appeals from such institutions. 
 365. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(f)(1)(B) (2012). 
 366. Id. § 4806(g). 
 367. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. Earlier OCC policies did not allow banks to use the 
MSD appeals process to challenge examiner findings that the bank did not comply with an 
enforcement action. See Material Supervisory Determination Decision of Second Quarter 2012, 
http://www.occ.gov/topics/dispute-resolution/bank-appeals/summaries/appeal-composite-component-
ratings-q2-2012.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4X8A-ZR4W (appeal of composite and component 
ratings and violations of law). 
 368. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. Under the OCC’s initial MSD appeals 
procedures, banks had more leeway to appeal MSDs underlying enforcement actions. See Golden 
Interview, supra note 13; Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 53 (testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig, 
Founder & CEO, Promontory Financial Group, LLC). 
 369. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10, at n.i.  
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The Federal Reserve policy states that its MSD appeals process cannot 
be used to appeal “prompt corrective action directives . . . actions to 
impose administrative enforcement actions . . . , capital directives, and 
orders issued pursuant to applications under the [Bank Holding Company] 
Act.”370 However, in one instance the Federal Reserve heard an appeal 
about whether a memorandum of understanding should remain in effect 
and in another instance evaluated the accuracy of an examination finding 
that a bank had not complied with an enforcement action. 
The FDIC’s policy is the most restrictive. It explicitly prohibits appeals 
of formal enforcement actions as well as “determinations and the 
underlying facts and circumstances that form the basis of a 
recommendation or pending formal enforcement action” and 
“determinations regarding compliance with an existing formal 
enforcement action.”371 Furthermore, FDIC does not allow appeals of 
“[d]ecisions to initiate informal enforcement actions (such as memoranda 
of understanding).”372  
The NCUA’s MSD appeals policy states that it is not available for 
“appeals of various administrative and enforcement actions.”373 Joy K. 
Lee, Chair of the NCUA’s Supervisory Review Committee, explains that 
an enforcement action does not cut off a credit union’s right to use the 
MSD appeals process; credit unions can still challenge facts that relate to 
the enforcement action.
374
 
In sum, regulators reach different conclusions about whether financial 
institutions can appeal the facts and determinations underlying 
enforcement actions and about whether institutions can appeal a 
determination that the institution is not in compliance with an enforcement 
action. 
2. Standard of Review 
There is also disagreement and general confusion among regulators 
about the standard of review for evaluating MSD appeals. “Standard of 
 
 
 370. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16.473 (Mar. 30, 1995). 
 371. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,057 (Mar. 23, 2012). Earlier 
FDIC policies were not so restrictive. Id. at 17,056 (noting the FDIC policy was amended in 2008 “to 
modify the supervisory determinations eligible for appeal to eliminate the ability of an FDIC-
supervised institution to file an appeal with the SARC for determinations, or the facts and 
circumstances underlying a recommended or pending formal enforcement-related action or decision, 
and to make limited technical amendments”). 
 372. Id. at 17,057. 
 373. NCUA IRPS, supra note 287, at 3.  
 374. See supra notes 314–16 and accompanying text. 
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review” refers to the level of deference the appellate authority affords the 
earlier decision maker.
375
 Possible standards of review range from the 
deferential “abuse of discretion” standard to the non-deferential “de novo” 
standard.
376
 Because changing the standard of review adjusts deference 
given to the earlier determination, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that the standard of review used could make a practical difference in the 
outcome of a case.
377
 Thus, financial institutions that are allowed to appeal 
using a non-deferential standard of review could have a much better 
chance of success than those appealing under a more deferential standard. 
The Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 
1994 does not specify a standard of review for the appeals processes.
378
 
Without direction, regulators have adopted widely differing standards. 
The OCC policy states that “the appeal is limited to a consideration of 
whether the examiners appropriately applied agency policies and 
standards.”379 The current OCC Ombudsman says this approach is a 
“standard-based” review that does not give “deference to either side.”380 
The inaugural OCC Ombudsman described the standard of review as de 
novo.
381
  
The Federal Reserve, while stating that it wanted all institutions to 
receive “the same appellant rights regardless of the Federal Reserve 
district in which they reside,” did not adopt an agencywide standard of 
review.
382
 Left to their own judgment, regional Federal Reserve Banks 
provide a potpourri of standards of review from de novo in New York, to 
ad hoc (but probably not de novo) standards in Kansas City, to “findings 
and conclusions were based on sufficient evidence and were consistent 
with FRS policy” in Minneapolis, to no stated standard in other regions.383  
 
 
 375. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1535 (9th ed. 2009) (“The criterion by which an appellate 
court exercising appellate jurisdiction measures the constitutionality of a statute or the propriety of an 
order, finding, or judgment entered by a lower court.”).  
 376. See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 233, 243–46 (2009) (explaining that in “de novo” review the appellate body simply 
reviews the issue anew while in “abuse of discretion” review the appellate body uses a much higher 
threshold, such as whether the initial decision was “outside the scope of the applicable law”). 
 377. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (“The upshot in terms of judicial review is 
some practical difference in outcome depending upon which standard is used.”). But see, e.g., David 
Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 135 (2010) (concluding that “regardless of the 
standard of review, courts affirm agencies’ actions slightly more than two thirds of the time”). 
 378.  See generally 12 U.S.C. § 4806 (2012).  
 379. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
 380. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 381. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 382. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,472 (Mar. 30, 1995). 
 383. See supra notes 184–91 and accompanying text. 
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The FDIC “review[s] the appeal for consistency with the policies, 
practices, and mission of the FDIC and the overall reasonableness of, and 
the support offered for, the positions advanced.”384  
Neither the NCUA MSD appeals policy nor the appeals decisions 
themselves provide a statement on the appropriate standard of review. Joy 
K. Lee, Chair of the NCUA’s Supervisory Review Committee, describes a 
review process that does not give deference to either credit union or the 
examiner.
385
 
B. Few Appeals 
Another shortcoming of the current MSD appeals processes is that 
there are few appeals. Thousands of financial institutions have been 
examined every year since regulators adopted MSD appeals policies in 
1995. Yet the OCC Ombudsman has issued 157 decisions, the Federal 
Reserve has decided 25 appeals (although data from 1995–2000 are 
unavailable for the Federal Reserve), the FDIC’s Supervision Appeals 
Review Committee has issued 63 decisions, and the NCUA’s Supervisory 
Review Committee has issued six decisions.
386
 One regulator has touted 
the small number of appeals as evidence that institutions are happy with 
the examination process and that examiners make few mistakes.
387
 There 
is, however, reason to believe this view is overly optimistic. 
Surveys suggest that financial institutions would like to appeal MSDs 
far more often than they actually do. In 2011, the Alliance of Bankers 
Associations, in connection with the American Bankers Association, 
conducted a nation-wide survey questioning banks about their most recent 
examination. The survey, which received more than 1000 responses, asked 
banks to rate satisfaction with the most recent examination and results on a 
1 to 5 scale with 1 being very satisfied and 5 being very unsatisfied. More 
than 30% of responding banks were unsatisfied or very unsatisfied.
388
 
 
 
 384. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,058 (Mar. 23, 2012). 
 385. See supra notes 325–26 and accompanying text.  
 386. The number of appeals at the FDIC and NCUA is somewhat larger if you consider appeals to 
or contacts with officials housed within the regulators’ examination functions (Director or Regional 
Office appeals). See supra Figures 8, 11. But even considering these early-stage appeals, utilization of 
the MSD appeals processes seems low. 
 387. Heather Anderson, Marquis: Lack of Appeals a Sign the Exam System Is Working, CREDIT 
UNION TIMES, July 6, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 14198420 (“The fact that only four credit 
unions have elevated an exam appeal to the NCUA’s supervisory review committee in the past 10 
years is a sign the exam system is working, [NCUA] Executive Director David Marquis told Credit 
Union Times.”). 
 388. AM. BANKERS ASS’N & STATE BANKERS ASS’NS, SUMMARY REPORT FROM BANKS 
SUPERVISED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 5 (2012), available at 
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Respondents were also asked to evaluate agreement with the assigned 
CAMELS rating on the same 1 to 5 scale. That question yielded an 
average response of 3.38,
389
 evidencing some disagreement with 
examination ratings. 
Moreover, surveys of credit unions produced similar results. In 2010, 
the Credit Union National Association conducted a survey in which “27% 
of respondents reported dissatisfaction with their most recent exam.”390 
Moreover, “one-in-five (21%) [of the responding credit unions] indicated 
that they wanted to appeal but did not.”391 “Two-thirds of the credit unions 
that wanted to appeal indicated they did not appeal for fear of retaliation 
by examination staff. Nearly the same number indicated they did not 
appeal because they did not believe it would make a difference in 
outcome.”392  
The Credit Union National Association performed a second survey 
about the examination process in 2012. While it did not specifically ask 
about the MSD appeals process, it did ask about credit unions’ agreement 
with examination results. The survey found that 25% of respondents were 
unhappy with their most recent examination and results.
393
 In addition, 
22% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with their current CAMEL 
rating.
394
  
 
 
http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/news/ReportforOCCMarch2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
BP5Q-SQRB (N=203, 10% very dissatisfied, 23% dissatisfied, 17% neutral, 32% satisfied, 18% very 
satisfied); AM. BANKERS ASS’N & STATE BANKERS ASS’NS, SUMMARY REPORT FOR THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE 5 (2012), available at http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/news/ReportforFedMarch 
2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U436-9H84 (N=133, 15% very dissatisfied, 20% dissatisfied, 
17% neutral, 26% satisfied, 21% very satisfied); AM. BANKERS ASS’N & STATE BANKERS ASS’NS, 
SUMMARY REPORT FOR BANKS EXAMINED BY THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 5 
(2012), available at http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/news/ReportforFDICApril2012.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/2JUH-BD4F (N=397, 13% very dissatisfied, 21% dissatisfied, 17% neutral, 31% 
satisfied, 17% very satisfied). See also Joe Adler, Banker-Examiner Relationship, Once Testy, Thaws, 
AM. BANKER, June 11, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 12040228 (reporting on the survey).  
 389. Adler, supra note 388.  
 390. Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 150 (written statement of Ken Watts, President & 
CEO, West Virginia Credit Union League) (citing a Credit Union National Association survey).  
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. Additionally, “[o]ver one-third of credit unions who had examination concerns did not 
appeal because they were not aware of the process.” Id. 
 393. CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N, 2012 CREDIT UNION EXAMS SURVEY (on file with author) 
(N=1531, 10% very dissatisfied, 15% somewhat dissatisfied, 15% neutral, 39% satisfied, 21% very 
satisfied). 
 394. Id. (N=1531, 8% very dissatisfied, 14% somewhat dissatisfied, 17% neutral, 39% satisfied, 
23% very satisfied). 
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These surveys are not without their faults.
395
 Each of the surveys relied 
on financial institutions voluntarily completing the survey form. Those 
dissatisfied with the examination process may have been more motivated 
to complete the survey. Thus, it may not be possible to extrapolate the 
survey results to the entire population of financial institutions. 
Nevertheless, the number of survey respondents that reported 
dissatisfaction with their examination is far greater than the number of 
financial institutions that utilized the MSD appeals processes. Thus, while 
it might not be possible to predict the ideal number of appeals, the survey 
data suggest the appeal processes are not functioning properly. Some 
financial institutions believe that appealing is futile. Others fear retaliation. 
C. Little Transparency 
Finally, the MSD appeals processes are far from transparent. It can be 
difficult or even impossible to get information about appeals decisions. 
Without transparency it is difficult to realize the objectives Congress 
sought in mandating MSD appeals processes: correcting “uneven 
treatment by examiners” and fostering “confidence” in the regulatory 
process.
396
 
Written and regularly disseminated decisions serve several functions. 
First, they can be a learning tool for regulators themselves. If decisions are 
public, all regulators can review the decisions and compare them with their 
current examination practices. How can regulators be expected to achieve 
any measure of consistency (either within an agency or across agencies) if 
one regulator has no idea what other regulators are doing?
397
 Second, 
written decisions act as guideposts for financial institutions. Institutions 
are better able to comply with regulator expectations when they 
understand what the regulators expect. Third, written decisions give the 
public a way to evaluate the MSD appeals processes and the examination 
function overall. As President Obama explains, “[t]ransparency promotes 
 
 
 395. An FDIC spokesman stated that the Alliance of Bankers Associations survey “has inherent 
limitations based on geography, sample size and other methodological issues.” Adler, supra note 388.  
 396. S. REP. NO. 103-169, at 51 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1935. 
 397. Cf. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995) (asserting that written judicial opinions are a device to “impose 
consistency and correct the judges who ‘err’”). Perhaps some regulatory consistency could be achieved 
by circulating decisions within an agency and sharing decisions across agencies. However, there is 
little evidence that regulators do this. 
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accountability and provides information for citizens about what their 
Government is doing.”398  
Of course, the OCC and FDIC deserve credit for releasing some 
appeals decisions. The OCC provides summaries of Ombudsman 
decisions, and the FDIC provides redacted Supervision Appeals Review 
Committee decisions.
399
 In both cases, the materials released generally 
allow readers to determine (1) the reason the appealing bank believes 
examiners erred, (2) the applicable law, regulation, or agency guidance, 
and (3) the appellate authority’s decision and accompanying reasoning. 
The Federal Reserve and NCUA are not as forthcoming. Even in response 
to FOIA requests, the Federal Reserve has never released its opinions.
400
 
Although the NCUA did release decisions from its Supervisory Review 
Committee,
401
 in many cases the opinions were so heavily redacted it was 
difficult to determine the precise nature of the controversy, the applicable 
law (or agency guidance), and the factors influencing the Committee 
decision.
402
 
MSD appeals that result in written decisions by the OCC’s 
Ombudsman, the FDIC’s Supervision Appeals Review Committee, and 
the NCUA’s Supervisory Review Committee capture only part of the 
financial institutions that use the appeals processes. In each of those cases 
the institution has either the option or the requirement to first pursue an 
appeal with an agency official who supervised the examination.
403
 The 
decisions reached at these earlier stages of the MSD appeals processes are 
a near complete black box. No regulator has released any written decision 
from this stage of the process. Furthermore, no regulator systematically 
provides summary information about appeals handled at this stage. Do 
financial institutions appeal? What do they appeal? Do they ever win? 
What do these decisions teach us about regulatory reasoning? Are these 
decisions consistent with one another? While I did my best to unravel the 
answers to these questions through FOIA requests and regulator 
interviews, much of this stage of the appeals processes remains a mystery. 
 
 
 398. Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) (Memorandum from 
Barack Obama, President of the United States, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies). 
 399. See supra notes 133–35, 255–56, 266 and accompanying text. 
 400. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 401. See supra notes 338–40 and accompanying text. 
 402. For example, an NCUA decision obtained through FOIA contained a paragraph that began: 
“According to the NCUA’s LCU No. 07-CU-12, CAMEL [redacted] credit unions.” The remainder of 
the paragraph likely contained the NCUA’s standard for a 3, 4, or 5 rated credit union. However, the 
remainder was entirely redacted. 
 403. See supra notes 80–82, 231, 292–94 and accompanying text.  
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Secrecy at this early stage of the MSD appeals processes may be 
especially problematic. These appeals are not addressed by a single 
appellate authority within each regulator but are instead handled by a 
variety of decision-makers. One division, region, or office may decide 
appeals differently than another division, region, or office. Moreover, 
because this level of appeal is addressed to an agency official more closely 
associated with the examination staff, this may be the stage at which the 
appeal is most likely to induce examiner retaliation. 
In sum, the lack of transparency stands as a barrier to consistency and 
confidence in the examination process. 
IV. STRENGTHENING THE APPEALS PROCESSES 
Given the weaknesses in the current MSD appeals processes, I 
recommend three changes. First, once examiners issue an MSD, financial 
institutions should have direct access to an appellate authority outside of 
the examination function. Second, the appellate authority should engage in 
a robust review. The review should consider a broad scope of appealable 
matters and employ a clear and rigorous standard of review. The scope of 
review and standard of review should be consistent across regulators. 
Third, regulators should release detailed information about each decision 
reached by the appellate authority. This Part will discuss these 
recommendations in more detail, but one of the virtues of these 
suggestions is that they could all be implemented voluntarily by the 
regulators. Congressional action would not be required.
404
 This Part will 
also address a more drastic proposal that would require Congressional 
action: the creation of a single super-Ombudsman for all financial 
institution MSD appeals. 
A. Strengthened Independence of Review  
Once examiners issue an MSD, financial institutions should have direct 
access to a dedicated appellate authority outside of the examination 
function. The OCC is currently the only regulator to provide this access; 
OCC-regulated banks can appeal directly to the Ombudsman.
405
 FDIC-
regulated banks and credit unions first address an appeal to an official who 
oversees the examination function.
406
 Federal Reserve-regulated 
 
 
 404. Of course, Congress could also choose to impose these requirements. 
 405. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
 406. See supra note 403. 
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institutions first address an appeal to an ad hoc committee that changes 
with each appeal.
407
 I propose that FDIC-regulated banks be allowed to 
appeal directly to the Supervision Appeals Review Committee and credit 
unions be allowed to appeal directly to the Supervisory Review 
Committee. I also propose that the Federal Reserve create an appellate 
authority to review MSDs. The appellate authority should consist of a 
person or group of persons who are not part of the examination function. 
Moreover, membership of the appellate authority should be consistent and 
not change with each appeal. 
The benefits of direct access to a dedicated appellate authority outside 
the examination function are threefold. First, consistent decisions are more 
likely to come from a single appellate authority (whether consisting of an 
individual or a small group) than from a number of different individuals 
who do not deliberate together (as is the case when appeals are first routed 
through division, region, or office directors). 
Second, a single appellate authority promotes transparency. Regulators 
do not regularly release any information about early-stage appeals that are 
routed to a division, region, or office director. Perhaps this is partly 
because these officials are so connected with the examination function that 
they presume complete secrecy is preferable. Allowing appeals to instead 
begin with a dedicated appellate authority outside the examination 
function may facilitate public release of summary or redacted opinions. A 
dedicated appellate authority outside the examination function may be 
better able to balance protection of information that could lead to banking 
runs with disclosure of information that could improve the examination 
function. Indeed, the OCC Ombudsman and FDIC Supervision Appeals 
Review Committee (appellate authorities outside the examination 
function) already strike a reasonable balance when they release their 
decisions.
408
 
Third, a more independent appellate authority may increase bank 
confidence in the MSD appeals processes. Financial institutions that 
disagree with an MSD may view the regulator’s examination function with 
suspicion. Assigning the first step of the examination function to 
examination officials does little to assuage this concern. Institutions would 
likely view a dedicated appellate authority outside the examination 
function as more independent, particularly if that authority publicly 
disclosed its decisions. The OCC gives its banks the choice of filing with 
 
 
 407. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text. 
 408. See supra notes 133–34, 255 and accompanying text (explaining the OCC’s practice of 
releasing summary decisions and the FDIC’s practice of releasing redacted decisions).  
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the Ombudsman or the Deputy Comptroller of the supervisory district that 
oversees the bank.
409
 Current Ombudsman Hattix estimates that about 
eighty percent start directly with the Comptroller.
410
 This suggests most 
banks prefer the appellate authority outside the examination function. 
B. Robust Review Authority 
Next, regulators should empower their appellate authorities to conduct 
robust reviews of MSDs. Each appellate authority should consider a broad 
scope of appealable matters. Furthermore, in considering appeals, the 
appellate authority should employ a consistent and robust standard of 
review. 
1. Broad Scope of Appealable Matters 
Financial institutions should be able to use the MSD appeals processes 
to challenge a wide variety of MSDs. All regulators should define 
appealable MSDs to include any examination rating. In addition, 
institutions should be able to appeal some enforcement action-related 
MSDs. 
a. Examination Ratings 
The NCUA is the only regulator to restrict institutions’ ability to appeal 
examination ratings.
411
 The NCUA allows appeals of CAMEL ratings 
(composite and component) only when the composite rating is 3, 4, or 5.
412
 
The NCUA defends excluding credits unions with a 1 or 2 CAMEL 
composite rating by noting that these credit unions have little reason to 
appeal.
413
 Yet banks have appealed CAMELS 2 ratings.
414
 These banks 
may be worried that unless errors are corrected early, the 
misunderstanding will eventually lead to further ratings downgrades and 
enforcement actions. At any rate, even the NCUA would likely concede 
that allowing appeals from 1 and 2 rated credit unions is unlikely to flood 
 
 
 409. OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10. 
 410. See Hattix Interview, supra note 13. 
 411. See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 412. NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 1. 
 413. Ulan Interview, supra note 13 (stating that “in practical terms, it doesn’t matter whether [a 
credit union is rated] a 1 or a 2”). 
 414. See supra note 364. 
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the NCUA’s seldom-used system. The NCUA should allow appeals on par 
with other financial institution regulators. 
b. Enforcement-Related Determinations 
There is little agreement among regulators about the extent to which 
institutions can use the MSD appeals processes to challenge 
determinations related to informal or formal enforcement actions.
415
 The 
issue, however, is important. Regulators typically place institutions that 
receive a 3, 4, or 5 composite CAMELS rating under informal or formal 
enforcement action.
416
 Although there are processes for contesting formal 
enforcement actions,
417
 doing so is costly and actions are reviewed under 
standards deferential to the regulator. Thus, most banks do not challenge 
enforcement actions.
418
 All informal enforcement actions
419
 and the vast 
majority of formal enforcement actions are entered by consent.
420
 In those 
circumstances, institutions have little opportunity to correct examiner 
mistakes. And by excluding enforcement-related determinations from the 
MSD appeals processes, regulators significantly restrict the usefulness of 
the processes. For this reason, Eugene A. Ludwig, a former Comptroller of 
the Currency, proposes that financial institutions be allowed to use the 
MSD appeals processes for issues related to enforcement actions.
421
  
My proposal is more specific. I suggest that institutions be able to use 
the MSD appeals processes for any material finding or decision underlying 
an informal or formal enforcement action entered by consent. Institutions 
should also be able to use the MSD appeals processes to challenge 
findings that the institution has not complied with an existing enforcement 
action, unless the regulator is currently asking a court to enforce the 
 
 
 415. See supra Part III.A.1.b. 
 416. Rives, supra note 29. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(8) (2012) (allowing regulators to impose 
formal enforcement when an institution receives “a less-than-satisfactory rating for asset quality, 
management, earnings, or liquidity”). 
 417. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b), 1831o (2012). 
 418. See supra note 43. 
 419. Hill, supra note 29, at 662–63 (explaining that “regulators acknowledge that they have 
informal regulatory powers” to convince banks to willingly enter informal enforcement actions like 
board resolutions, commitment letters, safety and soundness plans, and memoranda of understanding). 
 420. See id. at 675 (finding that 90% of formal capital enforcement actions between 1993 and 
2010 were entered with the consent of the bank). 
 421. Ludwig, supra note 48, at 9 (“If the ombudsman cannot delve into enforcement matters, he or 
she is precluded from getting into a whole variety of issues that could involve mistakes. Furthermore, 
matters involving enforcement actions typically are of great importance to the regulated financial 
institution. A second pair of eyes in such important cases not only avoids unnecessary harm but also 
enhances the agency’s stature as a place of probity and fairness.”).  
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existing enforcement action. In either case, the regulator would not be 
constrained in its ability to pursue an enforcement action and any 
enforcement action would remain in force during the pendency of the 
MSD appeal. 
I further propose that if the appellate authority decides that one or more 
MSDs were erroneous, top regulatory officials
422
 would consider whether 
the enforcement action should be withdrawn. If the regulator chooses not 
to lift the enforcement action, the institution should be given the option to 
withdraw its consent to the action.
423
 The regulator could then pursue 
formal enforcement actions under existing statutory authority, including 
statutes that allow for temporary orders without pre-order hearings in 
high-risk cases.
424
 In less urgent cases (such as when a regulator seeks a 
cease-and-desist order for an unsafe or unsound condition), the institution 
could contest the action through the hearing process. 
In the past, regulators have resisted proposals to allow appeals of 
enforcement action-related MSDs, claiming that such appeals would 
dangerously delay the enforcement process.
425
 My proposal, however, 
does not affect enforcement authority; it allows regulators the same 
essential tools they have now. It only provides a mechanism for 
institutions to ask regulators to reconsider underlying MSDs. In addition, 
both the OCC and FDIC have, at times, allowed review of MSDs related 
to enforcement actions.
426
 There is no indication that institutions’ use of 
the MSD appeals processes during the time these appeals were allowed 
hampered enforcement activity. 
Regulators assert additional review of enforcement-related MSDs is 
unnecessary because agency officials already vet enforcement actions, 
minimizing the chances for regulatory error and overreach.
427
 Regulators, 
however, tend to give the greatest scrutiny to those enforcement actions 
contested by financial institutions. Top agency officials rarely review or 
 
 
 422. I propose that the review of these enforcement actions happen at the highest level within the 
regulator: the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC Board of Directors, 
and the NCUA Board of Directors. 
 423. The financial institution’s board of directors should vote to approve the institution’s 
withdrawal from the enforcement action. 
 424. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(c), 1786(f) (2012). 
 425. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appellate Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,923, 15,926 (Mar. 28, 1995) 
(rejecting suggestion that “decisions to initiate informal enforcement actions . . . be appealable” 
because of “the possible abuse of the appeals process to delay or otherwise impede well-founded 
enforcement actions”).  
 426. See supra notes 368, 371. 
 427. FDIC, Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,822, 
54,824 (Sept. 23, 2008) (“All FDIC formal enforcement actions are reviewed by a number of high-
level FDIC officials both prior and subsequent to their initiation.”). 
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approve enforcement actions entered with an institution’s consent. At the 
FDIC, enforcement action decisions are commonly made by a regional 
director or regional counsel.
428
 The FDIC’s Washington office only 
becomes involved if the bank requests a hearing.
429
 The process is similar 
at the OCC
430
 and Federal Reserve.
431
 Because the vast majority of 
enforcement actions are entered by consent, the internal and opaque 
vetting processes provide little assurance of consistency. 
Finally, regulators note that financial institutions facing enforcement 
actions already have access to other appeals mechanisms.
432
 If an 
institution is unhappy with an MSD underlying an enforcement action, 
why not just contest the enforcement action itself? The answer is that 
contesting an enforcement action is a formal, expensive, and time-
consuming process. The institution must hire an attorney to represent it in 
a formal hearing before an administrative law judge.
433
 Following the 
recommendation decision by the administrative law judge, the regulator 
issues a “final decision and order based on the entire record of proceeding, 
which is subject to limited review by an appropriate court of appeals.”434 
The entire process can take two to five years.
435
 During those two to five 
years, the regulator continues to examine the bank, making additional 
material supervisory determinations and requesting or demanding 
 
 
 428. Hill, supra note 29, at 705. 
 429. FDIC, Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
54,824. 
 430. Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 115-16 (2012) [hereinafter Settlement Practices Hearing] (written 
statement of Daniel P. Stipano, Deputy Chief Counsel, OCC) (explaining that enforcement actions are 
generally approved by one of several supervision review committees). 
 431. Letter from Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
to Senator Elizabeth Warren & Representative Elijah E. Cummings (Dec. 16, 2013), available at 
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/migrated/uploads/12%
2016%2013%20Reply%20to%20Cummings%20%20Warren%201.pdf (stating that, of the “nearly 
1,000 formal, public enforcement actions the Federal Reserve has taken over the past 10 years,” only 
eleven were contested and therefore approved by the Federal Reserve Board). 
 432. Fed. Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 16,472 (Mar. 30, 1995) 
(rejecting a suggestion to allow appeals of some enforcement-related items because an existing 
“alterative [sic] appeals mechanism” allowed banks to “contest enforcement actions”); FDIC, 
Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations, 73 Fed. Reg. at 54,823 (“[T]he 
administrative hearing process and the right to court review of final enforcement orders have 
uniformly been found to provide all required due process.”). 
 433. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(h), 1786 (2012). Financial institutions cannot bypass the 
administrative law judge review. Judicial review is available only after an administrative law judge 
decision. Id. 
 434. Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 430, at 117 (written statement of Daniel P. Stipano, 
Deputy Chief Counsel, OCC). 
 435. Id. 
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additional changes.
436
 In these circumstances, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that institutions would be most likely to contest egregious and 
costly errors. If an institution could comply with an enforcement action at 
a lower cost than challenging the enforcement action, that institution might 
rationally consent to an enforcement action, even if it believes the action is 
unwarranted.
437
 
In contrast, the MSD appeals processes are informal, inexpensive, and 
speedy. Institutions can make their case directly to the appellate authority; 
they need not employ an attorney.
438
 Even in complicated cases, the appeal 
is heard and decided within a year.
439
 The appealing institution avoids a 
drawn-out, contentious process with an agency with whom it hopes to 
preserve a working relationship. Thus, a financial institution might use the 
MSD appeals process even if it would not contest an enforcement action. 
There are at least two pieces of evidence to support this conclusion. First, 
some banks have brought enforcement-related appeals through the MSD 
appeals processes.
440
 Second, in 2008, when the FDIC removed 
enforcement-related determinations from the list of appealable MSDs, 
bankers’ comments uniformly protested the decision.441 
In sum, if regulators adopted a broader scope of appealable MSDs, 
institutions would have more opportunity to correct examiner errors and 
we could be more confident that the MSD appeals processes provided 
consistent rights to all financial institutions. 
2. Clear and Rigorous Standard of Review 
Next, regulators should adopt a clear and rigorous standard of review 
for MSD appeals. As explained in Part III.A.2, there is inconsistency and 
confusion regarding the standard of review used by regulators in MSD 
 
 
 436. See supra note 19 and accompany text (explaining that regulators generally conduct yearly 
examination).  
 437. One hint that not all institutions who enter into enforcement action by consent agree with 
their regulators: these enforcement actions almost never contain admissions that the institution violated 
law, policy, or agency guidance. See Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 430, at 7, 10, 12 
(statements of Scott G. Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.; Richard J. 
Osterman, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, FDIC; and Daniel P. Stipano, Deputy Chief Counsel, OCC). 
 438. See supra notes 89, 320 and accompanying text. 
 439. See OCC OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 10; FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT, supra note 12, 
at 22; FDIC OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 33; NCUA OIG REPORT, supra note 12, at 24. 
 440. See supra Figures 2, 5, 9. 
 441. FDIC, Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,822, 
54,823 (Sept. 23, 2008) (“The commenters uniformly expressed support for an independent review of 
underlying facts, circumstances, and determinations, and that there needs to be ‘an effective and non-
biased appeals procedure for banks.’”). 
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appeals. Regulatory adoption of a uniform, clear, and rigorous standard of 
review could make the MSD appeals processes more useful in achieving 
consistency. I would select a de novo standard for both findings of fact 
and issues of law and policy. 
At present, three regulators consider whether the MSD is consistent 
with regulator policies and standards.
442
 This check is important; examiner 
decisions should be consistent with the law and previous regulatory 
pronouncements. However, it is not sufficient to ensure that examiner 
decisions are consistent. While some appeals may involve MSDs that are 
straightforward applications of law or written policy,
443
 other appeals 
might present different issues. 
Some appeals may involve questions of fact. For example, in rating a 
loan, one factor considered is the value of the collateral securing the 
loan.
444
 The financial institution and the regulator may have differing 
conclusions about the value of that collateral. The examiner may have 
properly classified the loan according to policy, but nevertheless arrived at 
the wrong classification because the factual assessment of the value of the 
collateral was incorrect. Standards of review that refer only to law and 
policy are unhelpful in addressing such factual disputes. 
A “consistent with agency policy”445 standard is also problematic when 
existing law and written policy do not cover the issue raised by the 
financial institution. For example, with respect to capital adequacy, 
regulators have detailed regulations setting minimum levels, but regulators 
often require additional capital.
446
 Exactly how regulators determine the 
amount of additional capital is not included in any public pronouncement 
and is rarely explained to financial institutions.
447
 Indeed, financial 
institution regulators sometimes admit that some MSDs are not explicitly 
 
 
 442. See OCC BULLETIN 2013–15, supra note 10; FRB Kansas City Appeals, supra note 163, at 6; 
FRB Minneapolis Appeals, supra note 163, at 4; FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 
17,055, 17,058 (Mar. 23, 2012). 
 443. Hattix Interview, supra note 13 (“Most of what we do, most of it is driven by the number or 
policy that says, ‘Here’s how you treat certain situations.’”). 
 444. See, e.g., DIV. OF SUPERVISION & CONSUMER PROT., FDIC, RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF 
EXAMINATION POLICIES § 3.2-41 (2012) (“Substandard loans are inadequately protected by the current 
sound worth and paying capacity of the obligor or of the collateral pledged, if any.”). 
 445. See OCC BULLETIN 2013 L15, supra note 10; FRB Kansas City Appeals, supra note 163, at 
6; FRB Minneapolis Appeals, supra note 163, at 4; FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 
17,055, 17,058 (Mar. 23, 2012).  
 446. See Hill, supra note 29, at 650–57, 698–99. 
 447. See id.  
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governed by statute, regulation, or even public guidance.
448
 It is when 
examiners are exercising individual judgment that variations across 
examiners are most likely to occur. 
So what happens when a financial institution appeals an issue that 
cannot be easily resolved by consulting governing law or written policies? 
At present, regulators might review the MSD de novo,
449
 review it for 
“overall reasonableness,”450 review it under a standard adopted specifically 
for that appeal,
451
 or perhaps not even review it at all. There would be 
value in simply unifying the standard across regulators so that each 
appealing financial institution has the same opportunity for review. 
Choosing the appropriate level of deference is more difficult. Because 
judicial deference to administrative decisions is a bulwark of 
administrative law, some may be tempted to graft similar levels of 
deference onto the MSD appeals processes. A court reviewing an agency 
administrative law judge’s decision would review questions of fact under a 
“substantial evidence” or “arbitrary and capricious standard.”452 A court 
reviewing questions of law or policy would apply Chevron,
453
 Skidmore,
454
 
 
 
 448. For example, in addressing a proposal to create an ombudsman outside of each of the 
financial regulators to hear MSD appeals, see infra Part IV.D, David M. Marquis, then-NCUA 
Executive Director explained: 
Currently, much of an examiner’s findings are based on sound judgment and sound business 
or industry practice. . . . For example, there is no hard-and-true formula about proper asset 
diversification. Today, if an examiner looks at a credit union’s books and sees too many 
mortgages with only a three percent down payment or inappropriately large mortgages, he or 
she will warn of overconcentration in the exam report. If, however, a credit union appealed 
this finding to an [authority outside the NCUA, the] NCUA could not point to the violation of 
a specific regulation, other than citing the fact that overconcentration is an unsafe and 
unsound practice. 
Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 131–32 (written statement of David M. Marquis, Exec. Dir., 
NCUA). 
 449. FRB New York Appeals, supra note 163, at 10(a). 
 450. FDIC, Intra-Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,058 (Mar. 23, 2012). 
 451. FRB Kansas City Appeals, supra note 163, at 6. 
 452. Agency factfinding established through formal proceeding made “on the record” are reversed 
only if “unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012). Agency factfinding 
established through informal proceedings are reversed only if “arbitrary” or “capricious.” Id. 
§ 706(2)(A).  
 453. Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(holding that courts must “give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” but gives 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes “controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute”). 
 454. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that when an agency is not 
empowered to act with the force of law, the weight accorded to the agency’s interpretation “will 
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade”). 
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or Auer
455
 deference. However, many justifications for judicial deference 
to agency determinations do not apply here. 
First, courts defer to agencies because the Administrative Procedure 
Act, or some other relevant statute, has instructed that they defer.
456
 
Congress has determined that statutory gaps should be filled by 
administrative agencies rather than courts.
457
 In contrast, Congress did not 
specify a standard of review for MSD appeals in either the Administrative 
Procedure Act
458
 or in the Riegle Community Development and 
Regulatory Improvement Act.
459
 Because both the MSD appeals process 
and the initial examiners are housed within the administrative agency, 
there is no reason to believe Congress preferred that the appellate authority 
defer to the agency officials who reached the initial MSD. 
Next, it is sometimes argued that judicial deference to agencies is 
justified by the agencies’ special expertise in the subject matter of the 
controversy.
460
 With MSDs, however, the appellate authorities have 
expertise. Indeed, agency officials who hear MSD appeals generally have 
greater training and experience than the examiners who made the initial 
determination.
461
 
 
 
 455. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)) (holding that interprets a test that is “a creature of [its] own regulations, [its] 
interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation’”). 
 456. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) 
(explaining that when an agency was authorized to promulgate safety standards using informal 
rulemaking, the Administrative Procedure Act’s standard of review for informal rulemaking was 
applicable). 
 457. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. See also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied 
Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 736 
(2002) (“[A] reviewing court lacks legitimacy if it attempts to displace an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute with its own interpretation of the statute. After all, Congress 
vested the agency, not the federal judiciary, with the authority to resolve the meaning of ambiguous 
statutory text.”). 
 458. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2012) (providing only that agencies provide “[p]rompt notice” and a 
“brief statement” when denying a “request of an interested person made in connection with any agency 
proceeding”). 
 459.  12 U.S.C. § 4806 (2012). 
 460. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944). See also Krotoszynski, supra note 457, at 736 (noting that pre-Chevron case 
law “squarely held that federal judges should afford persuasive force to the work product of agencies 
based on the assumption that agencies possessed greater expertise over their own statutes and policies 
than did federal courts”). 
 461. The OCC’s Ombusdman reports directly to the Comptroller. OCC BULLETIN 2013-15, supra 
note 10. Some Regional Federal Reserve Bank’s policies specify that officer, manager, or senior staff 
be appointed to review panels. See, e.g., FRB BOSTON APPEALS, supra note 163 (noting that the panel 
may consist of “three officers/managers from other districts”); FRB PHILADELPHIA APPEALS, supra 
note 163, § IV.B “senior” officials on review panels. In addition, Federal Reserve Bank appeals make 
their way to the Regional Reserve Bank Presidents and then a member of the Board of Governors of 
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Next, some note that judicial deference allows administrative agencies 
to create a single uniform interpretation of the law. If each court exercised 
its own judgment, different rules may apply in different jurisdictions.
462
 
With the MSD appeals process, deference has the opposite effect. The 
MSD process is an opportunity for a single appellate authority within each 
regulator to harmonize differing examiner decisions.
463
 If the appellate 
authority instead defers to the original examiner decision, we could end up 
with many different but “reasonable” interpretations of banking law and 
policy. 
Judicial deference “has also been justified on democratic grounds—
namely that agencies are politically accountable and courts are not.”464 
Again, this deference justification is not applicable because the MSD 
appeals process is housed within each financial institution regulator, rather 
than in a separate branch of government. The MSD appellate authority is 
at least as accountable as the examination staff. Indeed, the appellate 
authority is even more accountable due to the authorities’ generally higher 
position with each agency. Lower-level agency employees should not be 
conclusively deciding questions of law and policy (including any 
controversy about the appropriate application of law and policy).
465
 Thus, 
 
 
the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Sys., Internal Appeals Process, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,470, 
16,472–73 (Mar. 30, 1995). At the FDIC, the Supervision Appeals Review Committee must contain 
one FDIC inside board member and one deputy or special assistant to a board member. FDIC, Intra-
Agency Appeal Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,055, 17,056. The NCUA’s Supervisory Review Committee 
consists of “members of the NCUA’s senior staff.” NCUA IRPS 11-1, supra note 287, at 1. In 
contrast, a bank examiner might be an entry-level employee at the financial regulator. See Entry-Level 
Bank Examiner, OCC (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (describing the job of entry-level bank examiner).  
 462. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105, 
1121–22 (1987). 
 463. There is still the possibility that each regulator could come to a different conclusion, but 
adding deference only compounds the potential differences. 
 464. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 743 (2013). 
 465. As Professor Mark Seidenfeld explains:  
When an interpretation is made by a low-level official from a program, technical, or 
enforcement office within an agency as part of his day-to-day functions, the interpretation is 
likely to reflect the professional perspective of that official. It is unlikely either to go through 
a serious vetting process within the agency, or be the focus of congressional or White House 
attention. Thus, such an interpretation is more likely to reflect an idiosyncratic professional 
perspective than is one that has been reached after consideration by agency officials with 
different professional backgrounds or an interpretation that is sufficiently central to the 
agency’s mission that it will attract attention of those in the White House or on Capital [sic] 
Hill. 
Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 301 (2011) (citations 
omitted). Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency 
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the appellate authority deciding MSD appeals, should conduct de novo 
review on questions of law or policy. 
Finally, courts defer to agency findings of fact because the agency was 
in a better position to collect and evaluate the facts underlying the 
dispute.
466
 In the MSD appeals processes, the appellate authority has broad 
access to the underlying facts.
467
 The OCC Ombudsman has even visited 
financial institutions in order to resolve appeals.
468
 Moreover, a de novo 
standard of review of facts is not unprecedented for appeals within an 
administrative agency. For example, if an applicant is denied a Social 
Security claim, the applicant can request a hearing before an 
administrative law judge who reviews the facts and law de novo in 
reaching a decision.
469
 The administrative law judge does not defer to the 
agency officials who reached the initial eligibility determination. In MSD 
appeals, the appellate authorities are in much the same position as the 
administrative law judge. An initial agency decision has been made, often 
by a relatively low-level agency official. The appeals or hearing process 
offers the agency the opportunity to correct erroneous factual 
determinations as well as errors of law.
470
  
Thus, justifications for judicial deference fall short when applied to the 
MSD appeals process. Moreover, if financial institutions view the MSD 
appeals process as nothing more than a rubber stamp for the examiners, 
few institutions will appeal.
471
 Consequently, the MSD appeals processes 
should adopt a clear and robust standard of review. 
Some may worry that de novo review, particularly when combined 
with direct access to an independent appellate authority, will encourage 
financial institutions to “sandbag” examination staff. Rather than raising 
relevant facts or concerns with examiners, financial institutions might 
remain silent and then overturn the MSD through the appeals process. 
 
 
has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues 
on notice or by rule.”). 
 466. See, e.g., James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Generally 
speaking, district courts reviewing agency action under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard do 
not resolve factual issues, but operate instead as appellate courts resolving legal questions.”). 
 467. See supra notes 96, 173–74, 249, 317 and accompanying text. 
 468. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 469. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1429 (2014). 
 470. Colleagues have suggested that a robust appeals process might review question of law or 
policy de novo but reviews questions of fact under an arbitrary and capricious standard. For the 
reasons already explained, I believe the MSD appeal processes would function best with de novo 
review of all appealable issues. However, I believe that a uniform arbitrary and capricious standard for 
facts would be a significant improvement over the current system. 
 471. See supra note 392 and accompanying text (explaining that some credit unions report not 
using the appeals process because they believe it will not make a difference). 
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This, however, seems unlikely for a variety of reasons. First, the MSD 
appeals process cannot be used to stall enforcement actions. Financial 
institutions must comply with examiner instructions while any appeal is 
pending.
472
 Second, financial institutions are repeat regulatory players. It is 
not in their interest to antagonize regulators.
473
 Third, the historic success 
rate for MSD appeals suggests it would be foolhardy for a financial 
institution to think that winning on appeal is a foregone conclusion.
474
 
Even if reforms strengthen the appeals process, financial institutions will 
face risks when using the process. 
Some may also worry a robust standard of review will add to the costs 
of regulating financial institutions. Admittedly, it is difficult to predict 
what it would cost for appellate authorities to conduct a robust review. It is 
also difficult to predict to what extent the more robust review would lead 
to increased use of the MSD appeals processes. Given past utilization of 
the processes, I think it unlikely that additional costs would be 
astronomical. To the extent that a more complete review does increase 
regulatory costs, the cost may be justified by the improvement to the 
regulatory system. Finally, any increased costs will not fall directly on 
taxpayers. Financial regulators are funded by fees charged to financial 
institutions
475—institutions that are generally in favor of strengthening the 
MSD appeals process.
476
  
C. Public Disclosure of Appeal Decisions 
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, each appellate authority should 
provide summary or redacted decisions. The information provided should 
include (1) the reason the appealing financial institution believes the 
examiner erred, (2) the applicable law, regulation, or agency guidance, and 
(3) the decision and accompanying reasoning. 
Regulators’ primary objection to releasing decisions appears to be that 
MSD appeals consider confidential information from bank 
examinations.
477
 Regulators keep examination information confidential, 
 
 
 472. See supra notes 168, 315 and accompanying text. 
 473. See Zenneth A. Ziskin, How to Cope with Tougher Exams and Enforcement Actions, AM. 
BANKER, Dec. 28, 1992, at 4.  
 474. See supra Figures 3, 6, 10, 13.  
 475. CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 27, at 61–62; Connie Edwards Josey, Comment, 
State v. National Banks: The Battle over Examination Fees, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 463, 466–68 
(2002). 
 476. See infra note 483 and accompanying text. 
 477. Ulan Interview, supra note 13. 
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believing that negative information could spark a bank run or even a 
banking panic.
478
 
While secrecy may be warranted with respect to the examination 
itself,
479
 there is no need to extend complete secrecy to MSD appeal 
decisions. The OCC and FDIC have managed to strike a balance between 
releasing meaningful information and protecting sensitive information.
480
 
Even during the 2008 financial crisis, disclosure of MSD appeals decisions 
did not incite a bank run or banking panic. Cloaking the MSD appeals 
processes in complete secrecy serves only to insulate the processes from 
public accountability. 
D. Another Proposal: The Super-Ombudsman 
Others have advocated a more far-reaching change to the MSD appeals 
processes. Over the last few years, members of Congress have repeatedly 
introduced legislation that would create an appeals process outside of the 
regulators to review MSDs.
481
 The legislation would establish an 
Ombudsman Office at the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council. This “super-Ombudsman”482 would investigate bank complaints 
about regulators and hear appeals of MSDs. Financial institution trade 
groups support such legislation.
483
 Yet so far, none of the legislative 
proposals has made it out of committee. 
Regulators oppose a super-Ombudsman. They argue that a new unified 
arbiter could undercut regulators’ ability to effectively monitor the safety 
 
 
 478. See generally Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Secrets of Bank Regulation: A Reply to 
Professor Cohen, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 389 (2003). 
 479. Not everyone agrees on this point. See Heather Anderson, CAMEL Peace in Our Time, 
CREDIT UNION TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, at 1, 31 (describing disagreement between the North Carolina 
credit union regulator and the NCUA over whether it was appropriate to publicly release CAMEL 
ratings). 
 480. See supra notes 134–35, 266 and accompanying text. Some might argue that requiring the 
appellate authority to provide a public, written opinion will delay the appeals processes. Again, 
however, it appears that the OCC and FDIC have managed to provide decision information without 
significant delays. 
 481. See; H.R. 2767, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 798, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1553 113th Cong. 
(2013); S. 727, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 2160, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 3461, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 482. See Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 50 (statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Founder & 
CEO, Promontory Financial Group, LLC). 
 483. Id. at 78 (written statement of Albert C. Kelly, Jr., Chairman, American Bankers 
Association); id. at 150 (written statement of Ken Watts, President & CEO, West Virginia Credit 
Union League). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2015] WHEN BANK EXAMINERS GET IT WRONG 1183 
 
 
 
 
and soundness of the banking system. They assert that routing appeals 
through a super-Ombudsman could: 
 delay corrective efforts and introduce additional risk in the 
banking system;
484
 
 discourage financial institutions from properly 
communicating with examiners;
485
  
 result in decisions made by people who do not understand 
the examination process unique to each regulator;
486
 
 increase the cost of examinations by effectively requiring 
“examiners . . . to document each and every finding with 
specific references to . . . rules and regulations;”487 and 
 increase regulatory costs by creating another government 
bureaucracy.
488
 
I am not necessarily opposed to an appeals process housed outside the 
financial institution regulators. A single regulator could unify the differing 
treatment faced by institutions with different regulators. Institutions may 
also feel more comfortable bringing appeals to an appellate authority 
outside their primary regulator. To the extent that a super-Ombudsman 
would motivate regulators to more fully justify and explain examination 
ratings and other MSDs in examination reports, it would be beneficial to 
financial institutions and the examination process as a whole.  
 
 
 484. According to OCC Ombudsman Larry L. Hattix: 
Our concern is that creating an outside bureaucracy to hear appeals will significantly delay 
exam processing. [It would also] delay corrective actions that our supervisory process 
determines are necessary for the safe and sound operation of that bank or savings association . 
. . . If decisions are delayed because of an extended appeals period, bankers may be precluded 
from conducting certain activities until the appeal is resolved and a final decision rendered.  
Witkowski, supra note 121 (quoting Larry L. Hattix, Ombudsman, OCC). 
 485. Id. (“[T]he creation of an outside ombudsman may have a chilling effect on the everyday 
communication that is critical to effective supervision.”). 
 486. Lee Interview, supra note 13 (“If you had someone totally separate from the agency working 
on [MSD appeals], I just feel like it would put credit unions kind of at a disadvantage if you had 
somebody who was just completely unfamiliar with our processes and our institutions.”). 
 487. Hearing on H.R. 3461, supra note 5, at 130 (written statement of David M. Marquis, 
Executive Director, NCUA). 
 488. Id. at 91 (Jennifer Kelly, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Midsize and Community Bank 
Supervision, OCC); id. at 133 (written statement of David M. Marquis, Executive Director, NCUA). 
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However, creating a super-Ombudsman would require Congressional 
action. This may be an uphill battle because regulators uniformly oppose 
the proposals. And a super-Ombudsman potentially adds cost for both 
regulators and financial institutions.
489
 Moreover, simply changing the 
appellate body will not necessarily solve some of the major deficiencies in 
the current system, namely the inconsistent rules regarding when the 
appeals processes can be used, lack of a clear and rigorous standard of 
review, and the lack of transparency. Rather than waiting to see if 
Congress will impose a super-Ombudsman, regulators should take 
initiative now to improve their MSD appeals processes. 
CONCLUSION 
When Congress mandated that each federal financial regulator provide 
“an independent intra-agency appellate process . . . to review material 
supervisory determinations made at insured depository institutions,”490 it 
hoped the processes would “provide an avenue of redress . . . from uneven 
treatment by examiners.”491 Now, two decades later, the processes adopted 
pursuant to this mandate have hardly been used. Regulators differ 
significantly in the access they provide to the appeals process as well as 
the standards they use to evaluate appeals. Even finding out basic 
information about appeals decisions can be difficult. In short, the existing 
MSD appeals processes do not provide a meaningful avenue for correcting 
uneven regulatory treatment. 
To achieve Congress’s goal, regulators must strengthen their MSD 
appeals processes. Financial institutions should have direct access to a 
dedicated appellate authority outside of the examination function. 
Regulators should allow appeals of a broad array of determinations, 
including all CAMELS ratings and determinations underlying enforcement 
actions entered with the consent of the financial institution. Regulators 
should employ a clear and rigorous standard of review. Finally, regulators 
 
 
 489. A variant of the super-Ombudsman proposal by former Comptroller Eugene A. Ludwig 
suggests that a super-Ombudsman taskforce comprised of representatives from each regulator be 
grafted on top of existing regulatory MSD appeals processes. See id. at 50 (statement of Eugene A. 
Ludwig, Founder & CEO, Promontory Financial Group, LLC). An institution could approach the 
taskforce after exhausting the appeals process offered by its regulator. Id. Thus, the taskforce would 
“play more of a coordinating role among the ombudsmen at the regulatory agencies, and act as a safety 
valve or an appeals mechanism.” Id. Given the small number of appeals that currently make it through 
the existing MSD appeals processes, it seems doubtful that such a taskforce would be utilized enough 
to justify the cost. This is particularly true if no changes are made to the existing appeals processes. 
 490. 12 U.S.C. § 4806(a) (2012). 
 491. S. REP. NO. 103-169, at 51 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1935. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2015] WHEN BANK EXAMINERS GET IT WRONG 1185 
 
 
 
 
should release appeals decisions in summary or redacted form. While 
regulators may initially be skeptical of my recommendations, more robust 
appeals processes benefit regulators by lending credibility to the 
regulatory structure. 
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